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ABSTRACT
Engineering Incentives in Distributed Systems with Healthcare Applications.
(August 2011)
Brandon Reed Pope, B.S., Abilene Christian University; M.E., Texas A&M University
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Andrew Johnson
Dr. Abhijit Deshmukh
U.S. healthcare costs have experienced unsustainable growth, with expenditures of
$2.5 trillion in 2009, and are rising at a rate faster than that of the U.S. economy. A
major factor in the cost of the U.S. healthcare system is related to the strategic behavior of
system participants based on their incentives. This dissertation addresses the challenge of
designing incentives to solve problems in healthcare systems. Principal agent theory and
Markov decision processes are the primary methods used to construct incentives.
The first problem considered is how to design contracts in order to align consumer and
provider incentives with respect to preventive efforts. The model consists of an insurer
contracting with two agents, a consumer and a provider, and focuses on the trade off be-
tween ex ante moral hazard and insurance. Two classes of efforts on behalf of the provider
are studied: those which complement consumer efforts, and those which substitute with
consumer efforts. The results show that the provider must be given incentives when the
consumer is healthy to induce effort, and that inducing provider effort allows an insurer to
save on incentives given to the consumer. The insurer can save on the cost of incentives
by using a multilateral contract compared to the bilateral benchmark. These savings are
illustrated by an example showing which model features affect the savings achieved.
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The second problem addresses the decision to provide knowledge to consumers re-
garding the consequences of health behaviors. The model developed to address this sec-
ond problem extends the literature on incentives in healthcare systems to consider dy-
namic environments and includes a behavioral model of healthcare consumers. By using
a learning model of consumer behavior, a policy maker’s knowledge provision problem is
transformed into a Markov decision process. This framework is used to solve for optimal
knowledge provision policies regarding behaviors affecting coronary health. Sensitivity
analysis shows robust threshold features of optimal policies. The results show that knowl-
edge about smoking should be provided at most health and behavior states. As the cost of
providing knowledge increases or aptitude for behavioral change decreases, fewer states
are in the optimal knowledge provision policy, with healthy consumers dropping out first.
Knowledge about diet and physical activity is provided more selectively due to the to un-
certainty in the health benefits, and the time delay in accrued rewards.
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NOMENCLATURE
AAD average absolute deviation
AHA American Heart Association
AMI acute myocardial infarction
ARIC Atherosclerosis Risk In Communities
CHD coronary heart disease
CIAD conditional independence - additive dependence
CIMD conditional independence - multiplicative dependence
CMH Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel
EU expected utility
EWA experience-weighted attraction
FOC first order condition
GDP gross domestic product
HDL high-density lipoprotein
IC incentive compatibility
IND independence
IR individual rationality
FOC first order condition
MAD maximum absolute deviation
MH Mantel-Haenszel
MDP Markov decision process
NHLBI National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
QALY quality-adjusted life year
SSD sum of squared deviations
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11. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. healthcare system is a world leader in many dimensions, however cost effi-
ciency is not one of them. U.S. healthcare costs have risen at a much higher rate than that
of other developed nations, and in 2009 healthcare spending stood at 17.3% of the U.S.
GDP (Truffer et al., 2010). By comparison, no other developed nation spends more than
11% of GDP on healthcare (Organisation for economic co-operation and development,
2009). These expenditures total $2.5 trillion, and are rising at an unsustainable rate faster
than that of the U.S. economy. Although part of the cost increase can be attributed to the
development of new medications, availability of advanced diagnostic and surgical proce-
dures, and an aging population base, these factors are present in other developed nations,
and in fact the U.S. has one of the youngest median ages of the developed world (Rohack
and Einboden, 2006). Estimates on the excess cost in the system consistently exceed $500
billion (Institute of Medicine, 2010).
The rapid increase in costs has caused engineers to apply their tools and methods
at the healthcare industry, focusing primarily on the delivery and operational aspects
of the system. Such approaches typically neglect the inherently decentralized nature
of the U.S. healthcare system. The strategic behavior of healthcare system participants
is a major factor in the cost increases (Porter and Teisberg, 2006), and requires dis-
tributed solutions to control problems. Policy makers and payers have an interest in con-
trolling the autonomous decisions of patients, providers, and other system participants,
which can have enormous implications for healthcare expenditures. An estimated 80%
of heart disease, stroke, and Type 2 diabetes could be prevented by controlling the risk
factors of diet, physical inactivity, and tobacco use (World Health Organization, 2009).
This dissertation follows the style of Management Science.
2The estimated cost of these first two diseases alone was $503.2 billion in the U.S. for the
year 2010 (Lloyd-Jones et al., 2010). Incentives are a potential solution garnering increas-
ing interest as a means of distributed control for healthcare systems (Institute of Medicine,
2010; Valdez et al., 2010). Incentives can also perversely influence strategic behavior of
participants in several ways. For example, insurance contracts can reduce incentives for
preventive care by removing the burden of risk from individuals. Since modifying be-
havior through incentives is costly, the problem is to design incentives which balance the
benefits from controlled behavior against the costs of constructing the incentives.
The overall theme for this dissertation is designing incentives in a distributed health-
care system. This research promises to be generalizable to other systems since as systems
become larger and increase in complexity, centralized strategies become harder to imple-
ment and less feasible as means of system control. Other systems such as healthcare and
education systems contain some level of inherent distribution in decision making auton-
omy and thus require distributed solutions to control problems. One means of distributed
control is through the use of incentives to guide autonomous decisions. The task of en-
gineering incentives has significant potential to improve system outcomes for distributed
systems such as the healthcare system. Contracts, policies, and information are among the
ways that incentives are conveyed to agents in distributed systems. This dissertation inves-
tigates the question of how these tools can be designed to provide incentives to autonomous
agents in the healthcare system. The structure of this dissertation is as follows: Section 2
provides a general review of the literature on healthcare systems engineering research and
the work on incentives and strategic behavior in healthcare. More specific literature related
to each model is discussed within the respective sections. Section 3 studies the question of
how multilateral contracts should be structured when healthcare consumers and providers
can potentially take preventive efforts. Section 4 addresses some of the strong assump-
tions in the first model, and presents a model for designing incentives using information
3for consumers who learn about healthcare behaviors in a dynamic setting. Section 5 takes
the model introduced in Section 4, and applies the model to designing incentives to control
costs from coronary heart disease. Section 6 provides conclusions.
42. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Distributed Systems
Distributed systems pose challenges for engineers. Rather than optimizing or design-
ing from a centralized perspective, in distributed systems the information, resources, and
decision making authority are distributed throughout multiple agents. Shoham and Leyton-
Brown (2009) provide an overview of research in distributed systems including optimiza-
tion, equilibrium concepts, and welfare problems. Much of the focus on distributed sys-
tems has come from the computer science community, where distributed algorithms as
well as parallel and distributed computation are studied (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1997).
The classic example of a distributed system is an economy, in which agents (firms and
consumers) make transactions according to their own preferences and resources. The
foundational theory of Arrow and Debreu (1954) gives conditions under which an effi-
cient outcome for the distributed system is realized. However, many features of real world
distributed systems destroy such efficiencies. Among these are asymmetric information,
hidden actions, missing markets, externalities, bounded rationality, and bounded compu-
tational abilities. In such environments, system engineers face a challenge to move from
inefficient system outcomes towards efficient outcomes.
Sensor networks, supply chains, and healthcare systems are just a few other examples
of distributed systems which have garnered the attention of engineers. Recently, educa-
tion systems have become an interesting application of incentives. Fryer (2010) examines
data from school systems where financial incentives were tested to enhance student per-
formance. Education systems have interesting parallels to healthcare systems since at least
two groups of decision makers (students and teachers or consumers and providers) need
to have proper incentives for the system to achieve good outcomes.
5An analysis of systems with multiple decision makers is often built upon game theo-
retic principles. Classic game theory was developed in the 1940’s and 50’s by Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1944) and Nash (1951). See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a
comprehensive treatment. The theory seeks to motivate and predict outcomes and pre-
scribe decisions in situations of strategic interdependence. These situations arise when
agents’ optimal decisions depend on the decisions chosen by other agents. The concept
of Nash equilibrium predicts outcomes in which agents best-respond to other agents’ de-
cisions and have mutually consistent beliefs about how other agents play. Distributed sys-
tems engineering makes use of game theoretic principles since designs must be evaluated
in terms of the equilibria they sustain.
The theory of incentives in distributed systems has largely been developed within the
economic community. The field of mechanism design (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Ch. 23)
studies the problem a designer faces in constructing the rules by which a distributed sys-
tem functions. A mechanism designer faces an environment, e ∈ E, and an outcome space
Y . Given the designer’s objective correspondence F : E → Y , and beliefs about equilib-
rium behavior, the goal is to design a mechanism Γ =< M,h > consisting of a message
space M and an outcome function h : M → Y such that the mechanism implements the
designer’s objective correspondence. A primary application of mechanism design theory
is auction theory (Krishna, 2009), where in some circumstances, the rules of the auction
can be designed to meet the designer’s goals of efficiency and/or truthful revelation of pri-
vate information. The special bilateral case of mechanism design is called principal-agent
theory (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). In principal-agent settings, such as the supervisor-
employee, lawyer-client, and teacher-student relationships, the principal wants to contract
with the agent regarding some task in order to ensure preferred outcomes are reached. In
realistic cases when the agent has more information regarding the task at hand, or the prin-
cipal cannot perfectly observe the agent’s action, the full information efficient outcomes
6are generally unattainable. These causes of inefficiency are called adverse selection and
moral hazard, stemming from the insurance literature. Mechanism design and principal-
agent theory have produced results and are increasingly applied in engineering and oper-
ations research Cachon and Zhang (2006); Fuloria and Zenios (2001); Gallien (2006); Su
and Zenios (2006). Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) provide a comprehensive survey of the
literature on contracting in principal-agent and more general multiagent circumstances.
For a summary of the empirical evidence to support the theory of incentives, see Prender-
gast (1999). As a distributed system, healthcare systems are of particular interest because
of the complexity, cost, and inefficiency.
2.2 Healthcare Systems Engineering
The recent explosion of healthcare costs in the U.S. has led to an equal explosion
in healthcare research in systems engineering and related fields. A large portion of this
growth has focused on applying existing methods to familiar engineering problems in
healthcare settings such as scheduling (Patrick et al., 2008), logistics (Daskin and Dean,
2004), and supply chain management (Pierskalla, 2004). Another component of the growth
can be largely classified as tackling problems in medical decision making, such as optimal
timing of interventions (Denton et al., 2009; Shechter et al., 2008) and optimal procedure
protocols (Lee and Zaider, 2008). Decision making at the policy level has also received
some attention in the areas of substance control and treatment (Tragler et al., 2001), im-
munizations (Engineer et al., 2009), cost-effectiveness studies (Owens et al., 2004), and
the diffusion and value of health information technology (Diana, 2009). Another major
area of interest to policy makers (Antos et al., 2009), yet receiving little attention from the
engineering community, is related to the decision making, as guided by incentives, of the
distributed players in the healthcare system. Existing efforts include Fuloria and Zenios
7(2001) who study incentives between a payer and a provider in a dynamic environment
where treatment intensity is unobservable, and Yaesoubi and Roberts (2009), who study
contracts to coordinate actions between a healthcare purchaser and a provider controlling
the number of individuals receiving an intervention. The majority of the existing liter-
ature studying incentive issues in healthcare systems comes from the health economics
community, where research has focused on incentives between consumers, providers, and
insurers.
2.2.1 Incentives in Healthcare Systems
Consumers of healthcare introduce several inefficiencies into the healthcare system,
stemming from both private information and non-contractible actions. When these are
non-existent, the full information, or first best, insurance contract provides a more risk
averse consumer with full insurance from a less risk averse insurer. However, when unob-
served, or at least non-contractible actions (e.g. diet, exercise) which affect the consumer’s
probability of illness are present, insurance against healthcare costs leads to ex ante moral
hazard. Uninsured consumers would take preventive actions when the expected benefits
exceed the costs, but insured consumers will have reduced incentive to take such actions
when they are costly. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) first considered this mode of moral haz-
ard and gave conditions under which the second best contract leaves the consumer with
some risk. These ex ante moral hazard circumstances arise frequently in health insurance
since consumers have many actions which insurers cannot fully observe, yet affect their
risk of healthcare expenditures. In order to leave the consumer with some risk, insurers
write contracts with deductibles, co-insurance rates, and copayments. Additionally, if true
health states of consumers are impossible or too costly to observe, health insurance con-
tracts cannot be written on the state of the consumer’s health, and therefore contracts are
8frequently written on the basis of healthcare expenditures. Ex post moral hazard arises
in this environment since consumers who face reduced marginal costs of treatment will
demand treatment at excessive levels. The seminal work of Zeckhauser (1970) studies the
trade off between this ex post moral hazard and efficiency of risk reduction, then designs
optimal incentive contracts for efficient expenditures. Zweifel et al. (2009, ch.6) present
models for both modes of moral hazard. Within ex ante models, they focus on binary pre-
ventive efforts and conditions for which full insurance or copayments are optimal. Within
ex post models, they conclude that copayments should be used to control moral hazard,
with higher copayments for more price elastic services. Other recent extensions to these
models include Ellis and Manning (2007), who consider a consumer facing both ex ante
and ex post moral hazard. They considers linear coverage for observable decisions of
prevention and treatment and derive the optimal coinsurance rates for each type of good.
Goldman and Philipson (2007) consider optimal insurance with a consumer under ex post
moral hazard with multiple goods. Their conclusions suggest that ceterus paribus, insured
goods which are substitutable will have lower copays, and those which are complements
will have higher copays.
Consumers also have private information regarding their risk types. In these circum-
stances, adverse selection occurs since individuals can select their most favorable plan
from a menu, with sicker consumers choosing more generous plans, and healthier con-
sumers choosing more moderate plans. Adverse selection creates inefficiencies whether
the equilibrium involves pooling or separating of types (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).
These inefficiencies can be controlled by designing an optimal menu of contracts, or by
adjusting insurance parameters based on characteristics of the consumer. For a summary
of the literature on adverse selection see Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000).
While the literature initially focused on demand-side incentives through the consumer’s
insurance contract, provider incentives, especially those specified by their remuneration or
9payment contract, has been another focus of the literature on incentives in healthcare sys-
tems. When providers whose incentives are not perfectly aligned with consumers make
quantity decisions (Ellis and McGuire, 1986), or have the ability to select patients (Ellis,
1998), the strategic behavior of providers driven by supply-side incentives in their remu-
neration contract can create inefficiencies. The consensus of the literature is that when re-
imbursement is contingent on expenditures, retrospective schemes (such as fee-for-service,
the most common method) will lead to excessive services and up-coding (reclassifying
patients into more lucrative diagnoses), while prospective schemes will lead to under pro-
vision of services and avoidance of high-severity patients, and that mixed schemes can
balance these trade offs. Prospective schemes include capitation, under which a provider
is paid a set amount per time period for each patient, regardless of services delivered.
Models which consider both consumer and provider incentives are similar to the model
presented in Section 3. This literature is reviewed and related to this dissertation’s model
in the following section.
10
3. MULTILATERAL CONTRACTING AND PREVENTION
This section analyzes the problem of designing incentives through contracts taking into
consideration the multilateral interactions in healthcare systems. The primary focus here
is on the trade off between ex ante moral hazard and insurance, considering both consumer
and provider incentives to solve the problem of optimal contracting in the presence of hid-
den preventive efforts. Results show that if inducing the provider’s effort is optimal, the
provider must be given incentives when the consumer is healthy. That is, the provider must
be better off when consumers are healthy rather than ill. Inducing the provider’s effort al-
lows an insurer to save on incentives given to consumers by distorting incentives from the
bilateral benchmark. The interaction between consumer and provider efforts is modeled
as both complementary and substitutive, showing the results to be robust. The optimal
multilateral contract is compared with the optimal bilateral benchmark, and an example
illustrates which model features and parameters affect the overall savings that the multi-
lateral contract is able to achieve. Subsection 3.1 reviews literature related specifically to
the model and approach taken in this section. Subsection 3.2 introduces the model, nota-
tions, and assumptions. Subsection 3.3 analyzes the insurer’s optimal multilateral contract,
studying the incentives given to each agent and the savings that the multilateral contract
achieves relative to the bilateral contract. Finally, subsection 3.4 summarizes the results
found.
3.1 Literature Review
The research considering the important problem of how incentives interact amongst
agents in the healthcare system has focused primarily on the ex post dimension of moral
hazard. Ellis and McGuire (1990) study incentives for a provider and consumer who
11
bargain over utilization and conclude that the optimal incentive system gives generous
insurance coverage to consumers, but gives providers incentives to control costs. Ma
and McGuire (1997) consider moral hazard when both a provider and insurer have non-
contractible actions in the production of health, and the insurer sees only a report (possibly
non-truthful) of treatment. Their results show that providers need cost-sharing incentives
when these actions are substitutes, and cost-plus incentives when they are complements.
Ma and Riordan (2002) study optimal contracts using both demand-side and supply-side
incentives, and study the level of utilization incurred relative to the full information bench-
mark. This literature highlights the need to consider both supply-side and demand-side
incentives in order to efficiently control agency in healthcare.
Prevention is an important topic to consider for reasons beyond moral hazard. Kenkel
(2000) provides a general review of the literature on the economics of prevention, includ-
ing moral hazard, externalities, lack of consumer information, and cost-effectiveness. The
model introduced in this section distinguishes itself from these efforts by focusing on the
ex ante dimension of moral hazard. One of the primary arguments diminishing the impor-
tance of ex ante moral hazard in health insurance has been that non-financial costs (e.g.
pain, discomfort, suffering) associated with adverse health events are uninsurable, there-
fore even financially insured consumers will have incentives to exert preventive efforts.
Even if this argument has been valid in the past, the trend in medical research and tech-
nology is progressing towards minimizing or completely eliminating these non-financial
costs. For example, the Door-to-Balloon (D2B) Initiative of the American College of Car-
diology encourages hospitals to strive towards reducing the time from when an acute my-
ocardial infarction patient enters the door to the time the angioplasty balloon is in the chest
of the patient to under 90 minutes. Removing the non-financial burden of disease will lead
to increased ex ante moral hazard amongst insured consumers. An example of this unin-
tended consequence could be argued from the case of coronary heart disease (CHD). From
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1970 to 2006, hospital-case fatality rates for CHD in patients age 65 and over fell substan-
tially from near 40% to just above 10%. This accomplishment of medical science led to a
greatly diminished non-financial risk of CHD. Over the same time horizon, knowledge of
and ability to prevent CHD improved greatly, which would have presumably contributed
to lowering incidence rates. However, hospitalization rates for the same group of con-
sumers remained roughly constant over the same time horizon (National Heart, Lung and
Blood Institute, 2009). This type of argument echoes Kenkel (2000), who notes that as
prevention and cure become more perfect substitutes, the ex ante moral hazard problem
becomes larger.
Empirical evidence for ex ante moral hazard in healthcare has been mixed, but appears
to be building. Courbage and de Coulon (2004), using U.K. data, find no evidence for ex
ante moral hazard with respect to exercising, check-ups, and smoking. Stanciole (2008),
using U.S. data, does find evidence of ex ante moral hazard in the choice of heavy smoking,
lack of exercise, and obesity. In the work most closely related to this section, Dave and
Kaestner (2009) find a ex ante moral hazard effect regarding physical activity and tobacco
consumption, and present evidence that providers do in fact influence consumer decisions
regarding preventive efforts. This influence of the provider highlights the need to consider
multilateral incentives as modeled in the next subsection.
3.2 Model
In order to create a more efficient healthcare system, solving bilateral incentive prob-
lems is not enough. The interactions of incentives between consumers, providers, and
insurers, and the resulting strategic behaviors must be studied. The main contribution of
this section is the consideration of both the consumer’s and provider’s roles in preven-
tion, and the implications for the optimal multilateral contract to control ex ante moral
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hazard. While most preventive efforts are ultimately in the hands of consumers, many
consumers look to providers for guidance and direction in prevention (Town et al., 2005),
and thus the provider’s incentives need to be considered. The first provider efforts consid-
ered are those which complement preventive efforts from the consumer. Examples of such
provider efforts with regard to cardiovascular disease include: asking about tobacco use,
advising every tobacco user to quit, encouraging 30 to 60 minutes of moderate intensity
aerobic exercise most days of the week, assessing body mass index on each visit and con-
sistently encouraging weight maintenance. More generally, these efforts can be thought
of as counseling and promoting the consumer’s preventive effort, explaining the benefits
and consequences of prevention, and educating the consumer about how to best imple-
ment preventive efforts. Although providers are ethically motivated to keep consumers
healthy, poorly designed incentives can put the ethical incentives and financial incentives
in conflict. Ethical motivations instead should support financial incentives to keep patients
healthy. Since the insurer acting as the principal, contracts with both the provider and the
consumer, the solution to the optimal contracting problem should be viewed in the light
of a principal-multiagent problem with heterogeneous agents, and optimal contracts must
consider the interaction of incentives. The issue of adverse selection on the part of the
provider is abstracted away from, taking the consumer to be representative of the popula-
tion.
3.2.1 Basic Assumptions and Notations
The basic model considers a risk averse consumer facing an uncertain health state,
which will be either healthy (h) or ill (i). That is, there are no varying degrees of illness,
or at least there is a single clear cut treatment option which restores the consumer to full
health, and does not vary with the level of illness. While this may seem like a strong
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assumption, it is approximately valid for acute illness episodes, and this assumption allows
focus on the ex ante dimension of moral hazard. The consumer may obtain insurance to
alleviate risk stemming from uncertain health states and healthcare expenditures. In the
case of illness, the consumer visits the provider for treatment which costs d to administer.
Let the insurer (I) offer a contract to the provider (P) and the consumer (C). Both the
consumer and the provider are modeled as having an effort action (eC,eP), with eP,eC ∈
[0,1]. These efforts are hidden from the insurer, and yet relevant for determining the level
of prevention utilized. The provider’s effort can be thought of as advocating or promoting
the prevention to the consumer, and the consumer’s action can be thought of as physically
taking the preventive action. The provider’s effort incurs a cost cP(eP), which reflects the
time and other resources required to exert the effort. The provider’s cost is assumed to be
increasing and convex, with cP(0) = 0. This convexity can be explained by arguing that
the provider can initially find the time to exert this effort without sacrificing much in the
way of other activities. As the level of effort increases, increasingly attractive activities
must be sacrificed which could have brought revenue or utility. The provider’s utility is
assumed to be separable in income and effort and initially assume the provider to be risk
neutral. The provider’s effort serves to lower the disutility experienced by the consumer
when the prevention is taken. The consumer experiences disutility ψ(eC,eP) from exerting
effort. This disutility is increasing and convex in eC ( ∂ψ∂eC ≥ 0,
∂2ψ
∂e2C
≥ 0) and decreasing both
absolutely and marginally in the provider’s effort ( ∂ψ∂eP ≤ 0,
∂2ψ
∂eC∂eP ≤ 0). These decreases
in consumer disutility can be thought of as the benefits of the provider’s effort from the
insurer’s perspective, and making the assumption that marginal benefits of the provider’s
effort are decreasing (∂2ψ∂e2P ≥ 0,
∂3ψ
∂eC∂e2P
≥ 0). We normalize ψ(0,eP) to 0. The consumer’s
Bernoulli utility function over wealth is denoted by u(·), which is strictly increasing and
concave, and consumer utility is taken as separable in income and effort.
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Figure 3.1 shows the time line of the contracting problem. In the first stage, the insurer
offers a contract which is accepted or rejected. In the second and third stages the provider
and consumer respectively choose their efforts, with the consumer observing the effort
level of the provider. In the fourth stage nature determines the consumer’s health state,
and finally in the fifth stage the contract is executed.
Figure 3.1. Contract Timeline
Insurer offers contract,
which is accepted
or rejected
Provider chooses
effort level
Health state
is realized
Contract is executed
Consumer chooses
effort level
The consumer’s effort impacts the probability distribution over health states. When
the consumer exerts preventive effort eC, the probability of being healthy is pi(eC) ∈ [0,1],
where pi′(·) > 0,pi′′(·) < 0. Notice that in this model, the provider’s effort and the con-
sumer’s effort are not substitutes in the sense that no amount of effort from the provider can
directly impact the probability over health states. This modeling assumption is geared to-
wards capturing the preventive actions that providers have in influencing consumer choices
such as those mentioned previously for cardiovascular disease. These actions are in con-
trast to preventive actions providers may take which directly substitute for the consumer’s
effort such as vaccinations. The effect of substitutive efforts is considered in subsection
3.4. After receiving provider effort eP, exerting effort eC, and facing incomes yh,yi in the
case of health or illness, the consumer’s expected utility will be
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U(yh,yi,eC,eP) = pi(eC)u(yh)+ [1−pi(eC)]u(yi)−ψ(eC,eP). (3.1)
The consumer is assumed to be educated regarding the health benefits of the preventive
effort, and maximizes expected utility (EU) with respect to the prevention decision. Un-
der these conditions, the EU maximizing consumer will exert effort until the point where
marginal benefit of prevention is equal to the marginal cost,
pi′(eC)∆u =
∂ψ
∂eC
(eC,eP). (3.2)
Where ∆u = u(yh)− u(yi) is the risk the consumer faces, the marginal value of staying
healthy. Denote this optimal level of consumer prevention as a function of the provider’s
effort and the risk the consumer faces by eC(eP;∆u). Clearly only partially or uninsured
consumers will exert positive effort. Then by assumptions on ψ(·) and pi(·), when ∆u
is positive, eC(·) is increasing in eP and ∆u (see details in Appendix). The insurer can
increase consumer effort by two means; inducing more provider effort and thus lowering
the consumer’s disutility of effort, or increasing the risk the consumer faces. The two
effects are found empirically by Dave and Kaestner (2009). Both these controls have
costs. Exposing the consumer to greater risk will limit the transfers the insurer can extract
from the consumer (i.e. how much the consumer is willing to pay for the insurance), and
inducing the provider’s effort requires more payments.
3.3 Analysis
The outcome of the system depends on the effort levels exerted by the agents. These
autonomous decisions are products of the agents’ incentives, which can be modified by a
contract. How this contract should be optimally designed is the main focus of the analysis.
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3.3.1 Private Insurer’s Problem
The analysis is performed from a private insurer’s perspective, with the insurer mod-
eled as having contracting power. This is likely the most realistic assumption since in
many healthcare markets the largest 2 insurers control the bulk of the market (American
Medical Association, 2007). Using data from 44 states, 80% of states have the top two
insurers serving greater than 60% of the market. The average share of the top two insurers
across these 44 states is 70.23%. Under this assumption the insurer will offer a contract to
maximize its own objective, taken to be profit (or positive margin in the case of a nonprofit
insurer). The contract offered by the insurer will specify a set of transfers from the con-
sumer and to the provider contingent upon whether the consumer is healthy or ill and the
intended effort levels for the consumer and the provider ({tCh , tCi , tPh , tPi ,eC,eP}), and guar-
antee the provider will treat the consumer in the case of illness. The strong assumption that
transfers can be made contingent on health states is weakened by the minimal health state
space ({h, i}). Under the mild conditions that healthy consumers do not seek treatment
while ill consumers do seek treatment, observing expenditures is equivalent to observing
the binary health state. This argument relates expenditures and health to a single condition
and individual. This presents little conflict with the geographic variations literature, which
casts doubt on the correlation between spending and illness based on data encompassing
many individuals, diseases, and other complex factors. Notice that from the insurer’s per-
spective, a contract establishes a random payment to be made to the provider and a random
payment to be received from the consumer contingent on the health outcome. These ran-
dom variables will be denoted by t˜P and t˜C. For comparison, the first case considered is
when the insurer has complete information regarding the agents’ efforts. Complete infor-
mation could be obtained by a costly observation process. After establishing the complete
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information results, the more interesting and realistic case of hidden information is con-
sidered.
Complete Information
In the case when efforts are observable, the individual rationality (IR) constraints of
the agents are active in the insurer’s problem. These constraints ensure that each agent
receives in expectation at least a reservation level of utility. Each agent’s reservation utility
is the utility they could obtain without participating in the contract. Let uh = u(w− tCh )
and ui = u(w− tCi ) denote the utilities of the healthy or ill consumer, with initial wealth
w. Also let f (·) denote the consumer’s inverse utility function (that is f (u(y)) = y), which
is guaranteed to exist by the assumptions on u(·). Assuming that uninsured consumers
receive no effort from a provider, the consumer’s reservation utility can be written as
U0 = pi(eC(0;∆u0))u(w)+(1−pi(eC(0;∆u0))u(w−d)−ψ(eC(0;∆u0),0),
where ∆u0 = u(w)− u(w− d). The provider’s reservation utility will be normalized to
zero. Then the provider’s and consumer’s IR constraints are given as
pi(eC)t
P
h +(1−pi(eC))(tPi −d)− cP(eP)≥ 0, (3.3)
pi(eC)uh +(1−pi(eC))ui−ψ(eC,eP)≥U0. (3.4)
With complete information, the insurer can specify effort levels in the contract, observe
the levels of effort exerted, and heavily penalize the agents if the contracted levels are not
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followed. The insurer’s objective is to maximize expected profits given by E[t˜C − t˜P].
Then the insurer’s problem is given as
max
{uh,ui,tPh ,tPi ,eC,eP}
pi(eC)[w− f (uh)− tPh ]+ (1−pi(eC))[w− f (ui)− tPi ]
subject to (3.3) and (3.4). Letting λ and µ denote the Lagrange multipliers of (3.3) and
(3.4), respectively, forming the Lagrangian, and taking derivatives w.r.t. uh,ui, tPh , and tPi
yields the following conditions:
λ = 1 ⇒ E[t˜P] = cP(eP)+(1−pi(eC))d, (3.5)
µ = f ′(ui) = f ′(uh) ⇒ ui = uh =U0 +ψ(eC,eP). (3.6)
The provider’s expected payments only cover the cost of effort plus the expected cost
of treating the consumer. It is worth noting that if the provider were risk averse, an optimal
contract would make him equally well off in each state of nature, similar to the consumer.
Such a contract could only be accomplished by a zero cost sharing scheme, with tPi − tPh =
d. The consumer obtains full insurance since marginal utility from income is assumed to
be identical in all states of health. The insurer’s problem then becomes
max
eC,eP
w− f (U0 +ψ(eC,eP))− cP(eP)− (1−pi(eC))d. (3.7)
Inspecting this objective, when ψ(eC,eP) is convex (for which ∂
2ψ
∂e2C
∂2ψ
∂e2P
≥
[
∂2ψ
∂eC∂eP
]2
is
a sufficient condition), since f (·) is convex, then f (U0 +ψ(·)) is as well. Then since
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− f (U0 +ψ(·)), −cP(·), and pi(·) are all concave, the insurer’s objective (3.7) is concave.
The first order conditions (FOC) then give that
pi′(eC)d =
∂ψ
∂eC
(eC,eP) · f ′(U0 +ψ(eC,eP)), (3.8)
c′P(eP) = −
∂ψ
∂eP
(eC,eP) · f ′(U0 +ψ(eC,eP)). (3.9)
Here (3.8) shows that the first-best efforts which solve the insurer’s complete informa-
tion problem equate the marginal savings in treatment payments to the provider by in-
creasing consumer effort and the increased cost of ensuring the consumer’s participation.
Also, (3.9) shows that the increased cost of ensuring provider participation by increasing
provider effort must be equated with the decreased cost of ensuring consumer participa-
tion. By offering a contract which satisfies (3.5),(3.6),(3.8), and (3.9), the insurer will
maximize expected profit while ensuring participation by the consumer and the provider.
Incomplete Information
When efforts are unobservable, the insurer must write the contract to ensure that the
agents exert the specified level of effort and accept the contract. In order for the contract
to be followed by all parties, it must satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints in
addition to the IR constraints. These IC constraints ensure that the agents’ best actions are
to exert the effort specified by the contract. The provider’s IC constraint can be written as
eP ∈ argmax
eˆP
pi(eC(eˆP;∆u))tPh +[1−pi(eC(eˆP;∆u))](tPi −d)− cP(eˆP).
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The consumer’s IC constraint can be written as
eC ∈ argmax
eˆC
pi(eˆC)uh +[1−pi(eˆC)]ui−ψ(eˆC,eP).
When these IC constraints are solutions to concave programs, they can be replaced by
their FOC’s. Earlier assumptions ensure that the consumer’s IC constraint is concave, and
a sufficient condition for concavity of the provider’s IC constraint is that e′′C(·) ≤ 0. This
intuitive condition is that the provider’s effort has decreasing marginal ability to induce
consumer effort. The concavity of both constraints is considered in more detail in the
Appendix, where some mild technical conditions are provided to ensure the concavity of
the IC constraints
pi′(eC(eP;∆u))e′C(eP;∆u)[∆tP +d] = c′P(eP), (3.10)
pi′(eC)∆u =
∂ψ
∂eC
(eC,eP), (3.11)
where ∆tP + d = tPh − (tPi − d), is the provider’s marginal value of keeping the consumer
healthy. From (3.10) one can see that the provider must have ∆tP +d > 0 in order to exert
any effort. Since pi′(·),e′C(·),c′P(·) are all positive, if ∆tP +d ≤ 0, then the solution to the
provider’s IC constraint will be to set eP = 0. Therefore, in any situation where inducing
provider effort is optimal, the provider’s remuneration contract must make him better off
when the consumer is healthy as compared to when the consumer is ill. This result is in
contrast to the typical use of cost-plus and fee based schemes where providers are only
reimbursed for procedures and services delivered to ill consumers. In circumstances when
provider efforts have significant influence over a consumer’s preventive behavior, inducing
provider effort is likely desirable, and the insurer’s optimal contract must create marginal
value for the provider when the consumer is healthy.
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The insurer’s incomplete information problem then becomes
max
{uh,ui,tPh ,tPi ,eC,eP}
pi(eC)[w− f (uh)− tPh ]+ (1−pi(eC))[w− f (ui)− tPi ]
subject to (3.3),(3.4),(3.10),(3.11). Although consumer and provider efforts appear in
the insurer’s contracting problem, they are autonomously chosen, hidden and thus non-
enforcible. However, the contract must be written according to the IC constraints of both
agents. Therefore, the efforts could be dropped from the contract without any effect, the
transfers determine the efforts chosen with the IC constraints are concave. Again let λ,µ
denote the Lagrange multipliers of the IR constraints, and additionally let γ,δ denote the
multipliers of (3.10), and (3.11) respectively. Forming the Lagrangian and taking deriva-
tives with respect to uh and ui yields
1
u′(w− tCh )
= µ+δpi
′(·)
pi(·) + γ
(
∆tP +d
pi(·)
)[
pi′′(·)e′C(·)
∂eC(·)
∂∆u +pi
′(·)∂e
′
C(·)
∂∆u
]
, (3.12)
1
u′(w− tCi )
= µ−δ pi
′(·)
1−pi(·) − γ
(
∆tP +d
1−pi(·)
)[
pi′′(·)e′C(·)
∂eC(·)
∂∆u +pi
′(·)∂e
′
C(·)
∂∆u
]
. (3.13)
The first two terms on the right hand sides of (3.12) and (3.13) are the standard terms found
in the second best bilateral contract between an insurer and consumer in the presence of
ex ante moral hazard. The final term represents a distortion from the classic second best
result due to the interaction between the consumer and the provider. The interesting factor
in this term, ∂e
′
C(eP;∆u)
∂∆u , can be interpreted as the change in the impact of provider effort
due to a change in risk the consumer faces.
Proposition 3.3.1 The consumer’s effort decision is a submodular function of risk and the
provider’s effort, that is
∂e′C(eP;∆u)
∂∆u ≤ 0.
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Proof in Appendix. It is tempting to think this term should be positive by following the
logic that when the consumer is exposed to greater risk (large value of ∆u), the provider’s
effort in promoting the prevention should have greater impact. Or similarly when the con-
sumer faces very little risk (∆u is small), the provider’s effort in recommending prevention
should not be worth much. This thinking, however does not take into consideration the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to efforts. That is, the consumer already has
strong incentives to exert preventive efforts when faced with great risk, and will prevent
without any recommendation from the provider. Exerting more preventive effort makes
less impact on the probability of illness, and will cost more. Similarly, when the consumer
faces little risk, not much preventive effort will be exerted, in which case a recommenda-
tion from the provider makes more impact since the consumer’s effort still has relatively
significant impact on the chance of illness, and does not cause excessive disutility. Cast
in terms of insurance completeness, this result can be interpreted as consumers with more
incomplete (e.g. via higher cost sharing) insurance have strong incentives for prevention,
and therefore will exert less incremental effort when encouraged by the provider.
Now going back to the Lagrangian and constructing the FOC’s with respect to tPh and
tPi yields
λ+ γ
[
pi′(eC)
pi(eC)
e′C(eP;∆u)
]
= 1, (3.14)
λ− γ
[
pi′(eC)
1−pi(eC)e
′
C(eP;∆u)
]
= 1. (3.15)
If γ 6= 0, (3.14) and (3.15) cannot hold simultaneously, since both bracketed terms are
positive. Thus, the optimal solution must have γ = 0 and λ = 1. Recalling that in the
classical bilateral principal-agent theory, the agent’s risk preferences cause the distortion
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in the second-best bilateral contract, the effects of the provider’s risk preferences on the
optimal multilateral contract are now investigated.
Provider Risk Attitude
Assume now that the provider has risk averse preferences characterized by a strictly
increasing and concave utility function v(·), the IR and IC constraints become
pi(eC)v(t
P
h )+(1−pi(eC))v(tPi −d)− cP(eP)≥ 0,
pi′(eC(eP;∆u))e′C(eP;∆u)∆v = c′P(eP),
where ∆v = v(tPh )−v(tPi −d). The FOC’s with respect to tPh and tPi of the Lagrangian from
now become
λ+ γ
[
pi′(eC)
pi(eC)
e′C(eP;∆u)
]
=
1
v′(tPh )
, (3.16)
λ− γ
[
pi′(eC)
1−pi(eC)e
′
C(eP;∆u)
]
=
1
v′(tPi −d)
. (3.17)
Since v′(·) > 0, the provider’s risk attitude will not change the result that ∆tP + d > 0
(equivalently ∆v > 0) in order to induce effort. When the provider’s effort is induced, by
the concavity of v(·),
v′(tPh )< v
′(tPi −d) ⇒
1
v′(tPh )
>
1
v′(tPi −d)
.
In this case (3.16) and (3.17) must be solved with a positive value of γ. Similarly, if the
provider is risk loving, then γ < 0. Then returning to the optimal multilateral contract with
the consumer, the following result relates consumer incentives in the multilateral contract
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to the first best solution of full insurance and the bilateral second best consumer incentives.
Corollary 3.3.1 When provider effort is induced (∆tP +d > 0),
• A risk neutral provider ⇒ γ = 0 ⇒ there is no distortion from the second best
bilateral incentives.
• A risk averse provider ⇒ γ > 0 ⇒ there is a distortion from the second best back
towards the first best.
• A risk loving provider ⇒ γ < 0 ⇒ there is a further distortion away from the first
best incentives.
The corollary shows that there is no distortion in the consumer’s incentives when the
provider is risk neutral. In general, the second best multilateral contract will differ from
the second best bilateral contract even in the case of provider risk neutrality. Since the
provider’s effort aides the insurer in inducing consumer effort, the optimal level of con-
sumer effort chosen in the multilateral contract will be higher than that in the bilateral
contract.
The result also gives that when the provider is risk averse, the insurer’s optimal contract
will shift the consumer’s incentives back towards the first best bilateral contract of full
insurance. Just as distorting incentives away from full insurance is costly to give to a
risk averse consumer, distortions back towards full insurance provide a savings. This
can be seen in Figure 3.2, in which uh,ui represent a full insurance contract, u∗h,u∗i show
the classic bilateral distortion due to moral hazard, and u∗∗h ,u∗∗i show the new distortion
attainable by the multilateral contract with a risk averse provider. The figure shows that
distortions given to a risk averse consumer are costly in expectation. Multiplying (3.16)
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Figure 3.2. Comparison of Consumer Incentives
by pi(ec), and adding (3.17) times (1−pi(ec)) gives
λ = pi(eC)
v′(tPh )
+
1−pi(eC)
v′(tPi −d)
> 0.
Since λ > 0, the provider’s participation constraint is assured to be binding. Similarly,
multiplying (3.12) by pi(ec), and adding (3.13) times (1−pi(ec)) gives
µ =
pi(eC)
u′(w− tCh )
+
1−pi(eC)
u′(w− tCi )
> 0.
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Similarly, µ > 0 forces the consumer’s participation constraint to be binding. Transfers for
the consumer and provider can now be solved by the system of equations: (3.3),(3.4),(3.10),(3.11)
all holding at equality. Solving leads to the following results:
tCh = w− f
(
U0 +ψ(eC,eP)+
1−pi(eC)
pi′(eC)
∂ψ(eC,eP)
∂eC
)
(3.18)
tCi = w− f
(
U0 +ψ(eC,eP)− pi(eC)
pi′(eC)
∂ψ(eC,eP)
∂eC
)
(3.19)
⇒ ∆u = 1
pi′(eC)
∂ψ(eC,eP)
∂eC
,
tPh = g
(
cP(eP)+
c′P(eP)[1−pi(eC)]
pi′(eC)e′C(eP;∆u)
)
(3.20)
tPi = d +g
(
cP(eP)− c
′
P(eP)pi(eC)
pi′(eC)e′C(eP;∆u)
)
, (3.21)
where g(·) is the provider’s inverse utility function (that is g(v(y)) = y). These transfers
could be used by an insurer to create an insurance contract for consumers, and renumera-
tion scheme for providers which gives optimal incentives for preventive efforts. Consumer
transfers given in the second best multilateral contract can be reduced from the second best
bilateral contract in two dimensions. Firstly, since the provider’s effort directly makes the
consumer better off, the insurer can extract more transfers in the contract. Secondly, since
the provider’s effort reduces the marginal disutility of effort for the consumer, the insurer
can also reduce the consumer’s incentives measured by distortions from full insurance,
which are costly to give to a risk averse consumer. The provider’s contract makes him
better off when the consumer is healthy (when income is tPh ) than when the consumer is
ill (when income is tPi − d). This marginal utility required to induce the provider’s effort
will cost the insurer beyond the expected costs of treatment and effort, which would be
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the costs associated with the second best bilateral contract. Since tPh +d < tPi , this contract
with the provider imposes cost sharing by paying the provider less than d extra when the
patient is ill.
3.3.2 Substitutive Efforts
Although the types of provider efforts discussed so far would seem to interact as com-
plements with consumer efforts, other activities on the part of the provider would likely
substitute with the consumer’s effort. Examples of these efforts would include free sam-
ples of medicine and other elements of treatment not reported. These efforts are modeled
as directly impacting the consumer’s probability of illness (pi(eC,eP)), rather that impact-
ing the consumer’s disutility from effort. The provider’s effort contributes to preventing
disease (pi′eP(·) > 0) but with decreasing effectiveness (pi′′e2P(·) < 0). The provider’s and
consumer’s efforts are modeled as substitutes (pi′′eCeP(·) < 0). The following analysis in-
vestigates under what conditions do the primary results still hold: that the provider must be
better off when the consumer is healthy to induce effort, and that inducing provider effort
allows consumer incentives to be shifted back towards the first best of full insurance.
Facing risk ∆u and effort eP from the provider, the consumer chooses effort eC ∈
argmaxeˆC pi(eˆC,eP)∆u−ψ(eˆC). This objective is again concave, and the consumer’s FOC
imposes that
pi′eC(eC,eP)∆u = ψ
′(eC). (3.22)
Based on the assumptions above, it is easily shown that the consumer again increases effort
in response to higher risk ( ∂eC∂∆u ≥ 0), but now decreases effort in response to provider effort
(∂eC∂eP ≥ 0). Heading straight to the case of incomplete information, the provider’s IC is now
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eP ∈ argmax
eˆP
vi +∆v ·pi(eC(eˆP;∆u), eˆP)− cP(eˆP).
Again focusing on the case when the provider’s IC constraint is concave, the FOC gives
that
∆v
(∂pi(·)
∂eC
∂eC
∂eP
+
∂pi(·)
∂eP
)
= c′P(eP). (3.23)
Proposition 3.3.2 ∂∂eC
(
pi′eC (·)
pi′eP(·)
)
≤ 0 ⇒ the provider must be better off when healthy than
when ill to exert any effort.
Proof in Appendix. This condition, that as the consumer’s effort increases, the con-
sumer’s effort becomes less effective in prevention relative to the provider’s effort, ensures
that increasing provider efforts lead to a higher likelihood of health on behalf of the con-
sumer.
The insurer’s incomplete information contracting problem is
max
{uh,ui,vh,vi,eC,eP}
pi(eC,eP)[w− f (uh)−g(vh)]+(1−pi(eC,eP))[w− f (ui)−g(vi)]
subject to (3.22),(3.23), and the individual rationality constraints
ui +pi(eC,eP)∆u−ψ(eC) ≥ 0 (3.24)
vi +pi(eC,eP)∆v− cP(eP) ≥ 0. (3.25)
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Using the same multipliers as before, differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to
vh,vi gives that
λ+ γ
pi(·)
[
pi′eC
∂eC
∂eP
+pi′eP
]
=
1
v′(tPh )
λ+ γ
1−pi(·)
[
pi′eC
∂eC
∂eP
+pi′eP
]
=
1
v′(tPi −d)
.
The condition given in Proposition 3.3.2 ensures the bracketed term is positive, and there-
fore provider risk preferences ensure the same signs on γ as were found in the case of
complementary efforts. Differentiating with respect to uh,ui gives that
1
u′(w− tCh )
= µ+δpi
′(·)
pi(·) + γ
(
∆v
pi(·)
)[
pi′′
e2C
∂eC
∂∆u
∂eC
∂eP
+pi′eC
∂2eC
∂eP∂∆u
+pi′′eCeP
∂eC
∂∆u
]
1
u′(w− tCi )
= µ−δ pi
′(·)
1−pi(·) − γ
(
∆v
1−pi(·)
)[
pi′′
e2C
∂eC
∂∆u
∂eC
∂eP
+pi′eC
∂2eC
∂eP∂∆u
+pi′′eCeP
∂eC
∂∆u
]
.
The final term again represents the multilateral distortion due to the provider’s influence.
The direction of the distortion again depends upon the sign of the term ∂
2eC
∂eP∂∆u .
Proposition 3.3.3 When ∂∂eC
(
pi′eC (·)
pi′eP(·)
)
≤ 0 and ∂2eC∂eP∂∆u ≤ 0, the conclusions of Corollary
3.3.1 hold for substitutive efforts.
Proof in Appendix. This proposition shows that the previous findings are not unique
to a single type of interaction between the patient and provider. Attention is now turned to
the value of multilateral contracting. Since the primary conclusions hold for both types of
provider efforts considered, only the first case of complementary efforts is presented.
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3.3.3 Value of Multilateral Contracting
The optimal multilateral contract provides both a savings on consumer incentives and
an additional cost on provider incentives when compared with the bilateral contract. Since
the insurer can simply induce zero effort from the provider, the savings will always out-
weigh the costs in the optimal multilateral contract. Without knowing the consumer and
provider utility functions, this is impossible to evaluate how much the insurer is able to
save via multilateral contracting. Thus to investigate, the consumer and the provider are
modeled by inverse utility functions f (u) = u+ ru2 and g(v) = v+ qv2. These functions
are not meant to provide general solutions, but rather to illustrate the possible savings
using plausible functions. These risk averse utility functions exhibit decreasing absolute
risk aversion, and higher values of r and q are associated with higher levels of risk aver-
sion. Then for given effort levels, the expected profits for the insurer under the multilateral
contract given by (3.18)-(3.21) is
pi(eC)[t
C
h − tPh ]+ (1−pi(eC))[tCi − tPi ] = w−E[u˜+ ru˜2]−E[v˜+qv˜2]− p¯i(eC)d
= w−
[
U0 +ψ(eC,eP)+ r
(
U0 +ψ(eC,eP)
)2
+ rpi(eC)p¯i(eC)
(
1
pi′(eC)
∂ψ(eC,eP)
∂eC
)2]
−
[
cP(eP)+q(cP(eP))2 +qpi(eC)p¯i(eC)
(
c′P(eP)
pi′(eC)e′C(eP;∆u)
)2]
− p¯i(eC)d, (3.26)
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where u˜, v˜ represent the random utilities facing the consumer and provider under the terms
of the contract, and p¯i(·) = 1−pi(·) for notational brevity. The insurer’s optimal bilateral
contract will induce effort from the consumer by setting
uBLh = U0 +ψ(eC,0)+
1−pi(eC)
pi′(eC)
∂ψ(eC,0)
∂eC
uBLi = U0 +ψ(eC,0)−
pi(eC)
pi′(eC)
∂ψ(eC,0)
∂eC
The insurer’s expected profit from the bilateral contract will be[
U0 +ψ(eC,0)+ r
(
U0 +ψ(eC,0)
)2
+ rpi(eC)p¯i(eC)
(
1
pi′(eC)
∂ψ(eC,0)
∂eC
)2]
+w− p¯i(eC)d. (3.27)
Let e∗C represent the optimal effort level induced in the optimal bilateral contract, and
e∗∗C , e
∗∗
P the optimal efforts induced in the multilateral contract. Then the insurer’s benefit
from using a multilateral contract will be (3.26) evaluated at e∗∗C , e∗∗P minus (3.27) evalu-
ated at e∗C, eP = 0. The analytical expression for this difference is too complicated to be
of direct interest. To illustrate the savings, the remaining functions in the model are also
parameterized. Let pi(eC) =
√
eC, cP(eP) = m · e2P, and ψ(eC,eP) = eC[a+b · eC− k
√
eP].
These forms are chosen for simplicity and to satisfy the earlier assumptions. The cost of
information under the bilateral optimal contract is compared to the cost of information
under the multilateral optimal contract.
Figure 3.3 shows the cost of information savings that are made possible by using the
multilateral contract. The axes show k and m, which represent how much the provider
influences consumer disutility, and how costly the provider’s effort is to induce. The value
represented on the vertical axis shows profit
incomplete
ML −profitincompleteBL
profitfullML−profitincompleteBL
. When m ≈ 0, the insurer
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can save nearly all of the cost of information, since the provider’s effort can be induced
without cost. When k ≈ 0, the insurer can save nearly nothing compared to the bilateral
benchmark since the provider’s effort makes no difference to the consumer.
Figure 3.3. Value of Multilateral Contracting (a,b,d,q,r,w)=(0.3,0.3,5,0.05,0.10,50)
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3.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
From Figure 3.3, there appear to be two distinct regions. One where the the savings are
relatively constant in m and rise in kθ, with θ < 1, and a second where approximately the
entire cost of information can be saved by the multilateral contract. The first region would
seem to be driven by the marginal disutility of the consumer’s effort, ∂φ∂eC = a+ 2beC −
k√eP. This expression is constant in m, and as k increases, the profits attainable by the
multilateral contract increase by the reduction in ∂φ∂eC as seen in (3.26). The second region,
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Table 3.1
Sensitivity Analysis of Multilateral Savings
Parameter (i) Threshold Effect (Fi(·))
k > 0
q ≈ 0
a,b,r < 0
where the full cost of information can be recovered by the multilateral contract, appears to
be driven by a threshold. Further analytical investigation of this region proves challenging,
however by varying the parameters of the model, several insights are available. Figure 3.4
shows how this threshold changes as the parameter a, which captures the consumer’s lin-
ear coefficient of disutility, varies. In the figure, a increases from the top left and moving
to the right. As the parameter changes, the threshold for m clearly decreases. In addi-
tion to a, the parameters b,r, and q were varied to determine their effect on this threshold.
From the base settings reported in Figure 3.3, a pair of two-way sensitivity analyses were
performed with (a,b) ∈ {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5}× {0.20,0.25,0.30,0.35,0.40,0.45,0.50}
and (q,r) ∈ {0.05,0.075,0.10,0.125,0.15}× {0.03,0.04,0.05,0.06,0.07}. The results
show that the threshold below which m allows full savings of the cost of information,
m < F(a,b,q,r,k), is a decreasing function of the consumer’s linear and quadratic coeffi-
cients of disutility from effort (a and b) and the consumer’s risk aversion (r), an increasing
function of the provider’s influence on the consumer’s disutility (k), and is nearly constant
in the provider’s risk aversion (q). Graphs showing the results of each trial of both two
way sensitivity analyses are located in the Appendix. Table 3.1 summarizes the effects of
each parameter on the threshold which defines the second region.
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Figure 3.4. Sensitivity of Savings to Consumer’s Linear Disutility Coef-
ficient. a = {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5}, (b,d,q,r,w)=(0.30,5,0.05,0.10,50)
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3.4 Results
This model in this section considered a health insurer contracting with a healthcare
consumer and provider whose efforts interact to stochastically produce the health outcome
experienced by the consumer. Focusing on the trade off between ex ante moral hazard
and insurance, the optimal insurance contract to induce preventive efforts was studied.
Although this analysis was done under the assumption of a private, profit motivated in-
surer, a similar analysis could be undertaken to design optimal contracts with providers
and consumers for a public insurer such as Medicare. The provider’s effort interacted with
the consumer’s effort in both complementary and substitutive fashions to capture the var-
ious activities providers may perform. The multilateral model highlights the two options
for controlling the preventive efforts of the consumer at the insurer’s disposal: modifying
the consumer’s risk over health outcomes, and inducing the provider’s effort. The results
showed conditions under which any optimal contract where the provider exerts effort, both
agents must be better off when the consumer is healthy. This finding supports recent in-
terest in devising new payment systems for provider accountability (Antos et al., 2009)
including mechanisms which focus on health outcomes rather than services. Compar-
ing with the second best bilateral benchmark, a risk averse provider allowed the optimal
multilateral consumer incentives to be shifted back towards the first-best contract of full
insurance.
While guaranteed to dominate the bilateral benchmark, the optimal multilateral con-
tract imposes both costs and savings when compared to the bilateral benchmark. By pa-
rameterizing functions from the general model, an example illustrated how the multilateral
contract is able to save on information costs, and sensitivity analysis showed how the sav-
ings possible vary as parameters of the model changed.
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This model makes several assumptions to maintain tractability. One particular assump-
tion called into question by the structure of the provider’s incentives is the absence of
selection against unhealthy consumers. Risk-adjusting incentives to keep heterogeneous
consumers healthy would be one extension to reduce this inefficiency. Contracts and the
contingent payments they generate are just one method of designing incentives in health-
care systems. Providing knowledge to encourage healthy behaviors would be another, and
is addressed in the next section.
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4. DYNAMIC KNOWLEDGE-BASED INCENTIVES IN HEALTHCARE
As discussed, incentives are a major area of interest to healthcare policy makers and
administrators. The majority of the existing work studying healthcare systems incentives
focuses on the interaction between consumers, providers, and insurers to control inef-
ficiencies from information asymmetries and distributed autonomy. While the primary
means of giving incentives studied in the literature has been contracts and the contin-
gent payments they generate, incentives can be generally thought of as any mechanism
that affects decision making. This broader view of incentives motivates interest in other
means of modifying behavior besides payments. The incentives considered in this sec-
tion are created by providing knowledge to healthcare consumers. Certainly a lengthy
discussion could be presented about the relationship and distinctions between education,
information, knowledge, wisdom, and behavior. These specific definitions and relation-
ships are beside the point of this dissertation. The question addressed here is that since
education/information/knowledge can modify behavior but is costly to provide, it is worth
investigating under what conditions is such provision prudent. The term knowledge is pre-
ferred to the term information to avoid the significant and varied loaded meanings from
various disciplines.
A general framework is presented for analyzing incentives in dynamic environments.
The scenario considered is that of a principal giving incentives to an autonomous agent
making repeated decisions which affect the agent’s state. This framework is not limited
to healthcare applications, the state of the agent could be quite general. The agent’s state
evolves stochastically according to the current state and decision, and the agent’s payoffs
are a random function of the state and decision made. Based on this general system,
a principal with preferences over the agent’s outcome would like to control the agent’s
decisions. However, the agent’s autonomy prevents direct control and incentives must
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be used. This general dynamic control problem can model a variety of principal-agent-
decision-state scenarios for which incentives could be constructed. This section focuses
on the case of a policy maker interested in controlling healthcare consumers’ behavioral
decisions affecting health states.
The model developed in this section makes three contributions to the study of incen-
tives in healthcare systems. The first contribution is the study of incentives in a dynamic
setting, whereas much of the existing literature on incentives in healthcare focuses on static
environments. Dynamics settings are important in healthcare applications since health
states are long lived and chronic diseases account for more than 75% of total healthcare
expenditures (Centers For Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). The second contribu-
tion is the departure from the majority of the literature on incentives in healthcare which
uses the expected utility (EU) framework by modeling consumer behavior via a learning
rule. Departure from this classic paradigm is motivated by the demands of rationality,
information, and intelligence imposed by the EU framework, which are especially strong
in healthcare and other complex settings. Empirical studies have also cast doubt on the
EU model as a description of healthcare consumer decision making (Hibbard et al., 1997),
and have shown consumers to be better at learning valuable behaviors when payoffs or
reinforcements are repeated as in the case of chronic diseases (Cutler and Lleras-Muney,
2010), implying the use of learning rules when facing such decisions. Finally, this section
provides an analytical approach to designing knowledge-based incentives, rather than the
financial incentives typically considered in the literature. This model provides a frame-
work for describing how knowledge affects a consumer’s decision making through a state
of attractions to various behaviors. The consumer’s attraction and health state evolution
over time, and a policy maker’s provision of knowledge combine to create a Markov deci-
sion process (MDP) from the policy maker’s perspective.
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The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Subsection 4.1 provides a re-
view of the literature on modeling in medical decision making at the clinical and policy
levels, consumer behavior and learning in healthcare and other settings, and the role of
health education as an incentive. Subsection 4.2 presents a model of dynamic behavior,
learning, and outcomes concerning a healthcare consumer, and subsection 4.3 discusses
how a policy maker could control this process.
4.1 Literature Review
Modeling health states and diagnoses as stochastic processes is a well accepted practice
in the medical decision making literature (Briggs et al., 2006). The Markovian assumption
assumes that probabilistic transitions are based on only the current state information. The
Markovian assumption in healthcare modeling has been popular since the seminal works
of Beck and Pauker (1983) and Sonnenberg and Beck (1993). When there is a decision to
be made at each epoch of the stochastic process, the decision maker’s problem is known as
a Markov decision process. MDP’s (Puterman, 2005) are a well known and applied frame-
work within operations research. This framework is used to model dynamic and stochastic
decision problems where rewards are earned based on state-action pairs, and states evolve
stochastically according to state-action pairs with the Markov property. Based on the Bell-
man Principle of Optimality, MDP’s can be solved by well known algorithms such as value
iteration and policy iteration. Applications of MDP’s in medical decision making include
Denton et al. (2009); Shechter et al. (2008). The assumption of Markovian transitions is
at times a strong one. The Markovian assumption can always be satisfied by enlarging the
state space of the model, but at a cost of increased computational burden. Strategies for
dealing with large state spaces include decomposition (Hazen, 2011). Testing the Marko-
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vian assumption can be accomplished by using data to compare the fit of models with
varying dependence assumptions (Welton and Ades, 2005).
Another strong assumption that the majority of the literature makes is that healthcare
consumers are EU maximizers. This assumption is often not a plausible description of real-
ity when decision makers face complex decision problems in which probabilities and pay-
offs are unclear and complicated problems themselves (e.g. healthcare decisions). In re-
sponse to this criticism, various non-EU models of decision making have arisen (Machina,
2004). Among these alternatives, learning rules are particularly intuitive and describe how
choices evolve dynamically in individual decision frameworks and games. Flexible rules
can serve as paradigms for various learning protocols such as choice reinforcement models
(Roth and Erev, 1995) and belief based models (e.g. fictitious play (Brown, 1951)). Mod-
eling consumer behavior through a learning rule provides a more reasonable description of
healthcare consumer decision making, and also allows investigation of knowledge-based
incentives.
Health education has been recognized as an important component of modifying con-
sumer behavior. See Glanz et al. (2002) for a comprehensive theoretical treatment includ-
ing theories of behavioral change for individuals and communities, and putting theory into
practice. Of the models presented the theories of planned action and planned behavior
(Monta˜no and Kasprzyk, 2002) are most similar to the models used in this section. Op-
erationalization of these theories is based in attitude measurement, or attractions, through
expectations concerning actions, very similar to learning rules. Maibach et al. (2002) dis-
cuss social marketing including mass media campaigns and its role as an incentive for
producing behavioral change. The problem of a policy maker providing knowledge could
be posed at several levels. At the individual level, this decision would be similar to the
decision to provide counseling services. Community based educational programs and in-
terventions have been considered a promising level of granularity for inducing behavioral
42
change (Merzel and D’Afflitti, 2003). At the state or national level, knowledge provi-
sion is roughly equivalent to mass media campaigns, and this is most similar to the level
of knowledge provision addressed in this section. Even beyond choosing what level to
place a knowledge provision policy, other distinctions are required including how to com-
municate the knowledge. Strategies include motivation, instruction, fear-based response,
and others. While important, these issues are beyond the scope of this dissertation, and
are discussed in more in the health education literature (Randolph and Viswanath, 2004;
Rimer et al., 2001). The next subsection introduces the model used to design knowledge
provision policies.
4.2 Model
The model presented here is of a healthcare consumer who chooses a behavior each
period from a finite set, at ∈ A . Consumer behavior in each period is stochastically de-
pendent on a state of attractions to each behavior st = (s1t ,s2t , . . . ,s
|A |
t ) ∈ S =R|A |. Based
on current attractions, the probability of choosing a given behavior is computed through a
stochastic choice rule f : S → ∆(A). The probability of choosing action a is computed by
the logit rule,
p(a|st) = e
λ·sat
∑
k∈A
eλ·skt
.
In this rule λ represents the ability of the consumer to best respond to current at-
tractions. The logit rule chooses more attractive behaviors with higher probability, but
chooses less attractive behaviors with positive probability as well. If the attractions are in-
terpreted as expected utilities, this decision making model relaxes the assumption from the
EU framework that consumers always choose the optimal decision. In this case, as λ→∞,
the logit rule approximates EU maximization, whereas λ = 0 implies uniform randomiza-
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tion between behaviors. The logit rule has shown to compare favorably to other popular
stochastic choice rules such as the power rule (Camerer and Ho, 1998). This stochastic
choice model is not meant to be normative, instead the uncertain behavior is meant to
capture heterogeneity in the population represented by a mean consumer, as well as ran-
dom variations in behavior at the individual level due to factors such as random shocks to
preferences or cognitive load.
The consumer’s behavior impacts current payoffs, future attractions, and future health
state. The consumer’s payoffs in each period are comprised of two components, a health-
based cost component, and a deterministic cost component,
pi(a,ω) = h(ω)+ c(a)
The health-based cost component, h, is a random variable reflecting costs from a realized
illness state ω in a given period. These costs may include direct and indirect costs as well
as costs from disutility. The illness state ω belongs to a finite set of possible states Ω. The
probability distribution of these states in any period is governed by the consumer’s current
behavior-health state pair. For example, if Ω = {healthy, heart attack}, a consumer who
is smoking and in a poor health state would have a higher probability of experiencing a
heart attack than a healthy non-smoker. The health-based component gives an unhealthy
consumer a worse expected payoff than a consumer in healthier circumstances. The de-
terministic component simply reflects the direct cost of choosing the behavior (e.g. the
cost of exercising). Based on the distribution of illness states conditional on the behavior-
health state pair, the consumer’s expected payoff of choosing behavior a in health state x
is computed by
Π(a,x) = E[pi] = c(a)+∑
Ω
ρ(ω|a,x)h(ω).
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The consumer’s future attractions are determined by current attractions, behavior, and
payoffs, and are computed through a learning rule, L : S ×R×A → S . The probabilities
of future attractions given current attractions, health state, and behavior are given by
P(st+1|st ,xt ,at) = ∑
ω(st ,at ,st+1)
ρ(ω|xt ,at),
where ω(st ,at ,st+1) = {ω : L(st ,at ,pi(at ,ω)) = st+1}. The consumer’s health state is as-
sumed to evolve according to a stochastic process with Markovian transition probabilities,
determined by health state and behavior in the previous stage,
P(xt+1|xt ,at ,xt−1,at−1, . . . ,x1,a1) = P(xt+1|xt ,at)
The consumer’s full state, consisting of attractions and health state, is then driven by
two conditionally independent Markovian processes,
P(st+1,xt+1|st ,xt) = ∑
a∈A
p(a|st) ·P(st+1,xt+1|st ,xt ,a) =
∑
a∈A
p(a|st) ·P(st+1|st ,xt ,at) ·P(xt+1|xt ,at).
The assumption of conditional independence is a simplifying assumption, but is motivated
by the sources of uncertainty driving the two components of the consumer’s state. The
uncertainty in attractions stems from the uncertainty over payoffs through the occurrence
of random acute events. These acute events can be caused by stressful incidents and the
short-term burden of behaviors. Whereas the uncertainty in health state stems from the un-
certainty in how the consumer’s health evolves in response to behaviors and other factors.
This latter uncertainty could be diminished by obtaining better information (e.g. by genetic
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testing) about the characteristics of the consumer. The following subsection discusses how
this process can be controlled by a policy maker.
4.3 MDP Control for a Policy Maker
The previous subsection introduced a model in which a healthcare consumer’s attrac-
tions and health state evolve according to stochastic processes governed by behavior and
payoffs. A policy maker or payer with preferences over sample paths would be inter-
ested in controlling the consumer’s process. This framework has been motivated by the
experience of a single consumer, however it is unlikely that a policy maker could design
incentives at the individual level for healthcare behaviors. Rather, the group of consumers
the policy maker is concerned with will be treated as an aggregate consumer whose at-
tractions and health evolve as described. Of course if a policy maker could reliably dif-
ferentiate knowledge between different groups of consumers they could design different
knowledge strategies for each group. Whether this objective is to maximize social welfare,
or to minimize costs, the sample path taken greatly impacts the policy maker’s objective
value. Since the consumer’s decisions are autonomous, a key complication in healthcare
and other distributed systems, the policy maker cannot directly choose the consumer’s
behavior, mechanisms, regulation, or incentives must be designed and used to control con-
sumer behavior.
One means of control would be through the consumer’s payoffs. Modifying payoffs
could be accomplished in a variety of ways: setting prices for treatment of acute events,
setting insurance parameters such as coinsurance rates, or taxing and subsidizing particular
behaviors. These financial incentives could all be designed to control the consumer’s
behavior with the policy maker’s objective in mind. The new approach introduced here
is to control behavior by adjusting parameters of the consumer’s learning rule. If the
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learning rule is a function of parameters under the policy maker’s discretion, then setting
these parameters can be another way of modifying consumer attractions and behavior.
The particular incentive under investigation here is providing knowledge to consumers.
Existing examples of providing knowledge to consumers are commercials on television
and highway billboards encouraging consumers to exercise more, eat healthier, and quit
smoking. These advertisements provide knowledge and educate consumers of the possible
consequences of various behaviors.
In order to model how knowledge affects the consumer’s attractions, the experience-
weighted attraction (EWA) learning rule will be used (Camerer and Ho, 1998). EWA has
been shown to be empirically flexible and economically valuable in a variety of settings,
and generalizes other popular learning mechanisms. In this model, the consumer’s attrac-
tions to each behavior, {s jt } j∈A , are updated according to the following rule,
s
j
t =
φ ·Nt−1 · s jt−1 +[δ j +(1−δ j)1(at−1 = j)] ·pi( j,ωt−1)
Nt
,
where Nt is a scalar representing the consumer’s experience at time t, governed by
Nt = ρ ·Nt−1 +1, t ≥ 1.
There are three parameters in the EWA learning model: φ,ρ, and δ. The first parameter,
φ conveys how experience translates into attractions, and the second, ρ characterizes how
experience accrues over time. The remaining parameter, δ ∈ [0,1]|A |, characterizes how
well the consumer gets payoff signals about behaviors not chosen, with possibly distinct
values for every behavior. The attraction vector gets updated with the full impact of the
behavior chosen, however for behaviors not chosen how strongly the attractions are up-
dated depends on δ. These parameters are modeled as a decision variables of the policy
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Figure 4.1. Policy Maker’s Markov Decision Process
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maker with the interpretation that the policy maker chooses how to provide knowledge to
the consumer regarding various behaviors.
Using this framework for how knowledge can be used to control the consumer’s stochas-
tic process, a policy maker’s incentive problem can be formulated as a MDP. Figure 4.1
shows graphically the process in which the consumer’s health and attraction states in the
rounded rectangle are stochastically modified and produce rewards based on the policy
maker’s decisions. The policy maker’s reward each period could be total costs of health-
care, consumer utility, or some other metric depending on the policy maker’s objective. For
generality write the reward as r(st ,xt ,δt), making explicit the cost of the policy maker’s
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decision, providing knowledge δt . Taking an infinite horizon with discount factor γ, the
policy maker’s objective is
max
δt(xt ,st)
E
[
∞
∑
t=1
γtr(st ,xt ,δt)
]
.
If the state space of the Markov process, (S,X), is observable and finite, solution pro-
cedures for the policy maker’s MDP are well known. In general, the policy maker may not
directly observe either of these variables. However the policy maker will likely have data,
or at least a sample of data with which to estimate the both the attraction and health states.
For example, if the policy maker observes the empirical distribution of behaviors chosen
in each period, the empirical probabilities, {p(a = j)} j∈A , can be used to form an estimate
of the attractions st . Using the logit choice rule the policy maker can solve a system of
|A |−1 linearly independent equations of the form
1
λ ln
(
p j
pk
)
= s j− sk
to estimate the attractions. Since there are too many degrees of freedom, the attraction
corresponding to the behavior with the highest frequency could be set to 0. This normal-
ization is reasonable since the behavior payoffs are costs (direct and health-related), and
since the logit rule is indifferent to a constant shift in all of the attractions
eλ(s
a
t −q)
∑k∈A eλ(skt −q)
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a
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∑k∈A eλskt e−λq
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a
t
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.
Data on health states and behaviors are available in existing data sets such as the National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). In order to meet the criteria of
finiteness for standard iterative algorithms such as value iteration, the attraction and health
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state spaces will require discretization. The following section specifies the model and
estimates parameters in order to solve for knowledge provision policies to control costs
from coronary heart disease.
As policy makers, healthcare payers, and engineers continue to search for cost saving
solutions, incentives will become an increasingly important research domain. This sec-
tion has presented a dynamic framework for designing incentives for non-EU maximizing
consumers. This framework is not limited in its usefulness to healthcare incentives, but
could be used in a variety of applications where indirect control of an agent’s state is of
interest. In particular, this framework can be used to design knowledge-based incentives,
in addition to more standard monetary incentives through contracts, taxes, and subsidies.
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5. KNOWLEDGE INCENTIVES FOR CORONARY HEART DISEASE
This section uses the Markov framework introduced in the previous section to de-
sign optimal knowledge incentives to control costs from coronary heart disease (CHD).
Constructing incentives to control CHD is desirable because of its prevalence, cost, and
preventability. After specifying the model and estimating parameters to control behaviors
affecting coronary heart disease, iterative algorithms can be used to solve for the opti-
mal knowledge incentive policies. Solving the MDP yields optimal strategies for a policy
maker to give incentives by providing knowledge about consumer behaviors. Data from
the Atherosclerosis Risk In Communities (ARIC) study conducted by the National Heart,
Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) is used to estimate parameters for the model.
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 5.1 reviews literature related to educa-
tional interventions for cardiovascular diseases. Subsection 5.2 develops the model spec-
ification of behaviors and health states pertinent for coronary heart disease. Subsection
5.3 presents the estimation of parameters, followed by a discussion of model validation
in subsection 5.4. This subsection on model validation is comprised of three components.
First, the full model is scaled down to knowledge provision for smoking behavior. This
allows solution with many more parameter settings to check the results of the model. The
validation focuses on the model results with respect the the experience of the consumer.
The experience parameter modifying how willing consumers are to change behavior based
on new payoff information, possibly including knowledge. After validating the results at
the boundaries and matching results to the observed behavior found in the empirical lit-
erature, sensitivity analysis provides insights into how the results vary with changing cost
parameters. The parameters varied are the direct costs of smoking, the consumer’s cost of
coronary heart disease, and the cost of providing knowledge. The interest in these param-
eters is further discussed later in the section. By validating the models performance when
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restricted to smoking behaviors, the full model can be partially validated without excessive
computational burden. The results on optimal knowledge provision policies are presented
in subsection 5.5, which also discusses possible extensions of the model.
5.1 Literature Review
Coronary heart disease is an important disease for policy makers to consider because of
its prevalence, cost, and preventability through modifiable risk factors. CHD affected 17.6
million Americans in 2010, for a total direct and indirect cost of $177.1 billion (Lloyd-
Jones et al., 2010). In addition to financial costs, the costs of human life are severe as
well, with 1 of every 6 deaths in the U.S. caused by CHD in 2006 (Lloyd-Jones et al.,
2010). Despite the costs, consumers still engage in behaviors which are major risk fac-
tors for CHD. Prevalence of smoking (21%), inadequate physical activity (35%), and high
saturated fat diets (46-67%, depending on sex and ethnic group), indicate the potential
for alleviating some of the cost of CHD. Due to its importance, several studies have im-
plemented knowledge-based interventions and considered best practices for designing the
interventions, cost-effectiveness, and their effect on prevalence.
Smoking is the behavior which has received the most attention from mass-media,
counter-advertising, and other knowledge-based interventions. Controlled experiments as
well as implemented community and population level interventions have shown the ability
of smoking cessation knowledge and promotion to change behavior. Results from various
geographic regions including California (Farquhar et al., 1990), Texas (McAlister et al.,
1992), Vermont and New Hampshire (Secker-Walker et al., 2000), Florida (Bauer et al.,
2000), British Columbia (Gagne, 2007), and Finland (Puska et al., 1985) have all shown
that providing knowledge about smoking can reduce prevalence or increase the cessation
rate. The amount of behavior change and the subset of the population significantly af-
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fected varies throughout these studies. These variations can be explained by differences
in funding and penetration, secular trends and other concurrent media and programs, and
the targeting and duration of the intervention (Davis et al., 2008). Excellent reviews on
the effectiveness of mass-media and other knowledge-based incentives for smoking can be
found in Chaloupka and Warner (2000), Davis et al. (2008), and Bala et al. (2008).
In addition to smoking, diet and exercise are two other behaviors which have been ad-
dressed by community or mass-media health education campaigns. Heimendinger et al.
(2007); Toobert et al. (2005); Wendel-Vos et al. (2009) all report positive behavioral
changes in dietary consumption and physical activity as a product of health education
programs. Stern et al. (1976) also report significant reductions in saturated fat and choles-
terol consumption as a result of a two-year bilingual mass-media campaign. Other studies
report significant changes in cholesterol and blood pressure levels of consumers (Diehl,
1998; Farquhar et al., 1990; Puska et al., 1985) without explicitly tracking diet and exer-
cise behavior. Lin et al. (2010) provide an extensive review of the literature and conclude
that behavior counseling is associated to positive (but small) changes in diet and physical
activity.
Recommendations for how to structure educational programs to reach their full poten-
tial include the need for programs to be comprehensive (Randolph and Viswanath, 2004),
hard-hitting (World Health Organization, 2008), targeted to specific subgroups (Winkleby
et al., 1994), and community/socially oriented (Schar and Gutierrez, 2001). General dis-
cussions on improving general, cardiovascular, and smoking-specific health education pro-
grams can be found in Rimer et al. (2001), Parker and Assaf (2005) and Davis et al. (2008)
The challenge in designing incentives to control CHD costs is that both the effec-
tiveness of interventions and the potential savings from behavioral change vary within
subgroups of any population. Ebrahim et al. (2011) review the literature on multiple risk
factor interventions and conclude that the interventions are effective for high risk groups,
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although not so for the general population. Research on the normative side of health
education has focused on the cost-effectiveness of interventions. Cost effectiveness mea-
sures for anti-smoking campaigns can vary based on the parameters chosen. Tengs et al.
(2001) use a dynamic model and vary cost, effectiveness, and recidivism to find that the
cost per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) of anti-tobacco education varies from $4,900
to $340,000. Ronckers et al. (2005) review and standardize many cost effectiveness stud-
ies and find that the cost per year of life saved ranges from $1,000 to $15,000 depending
on the target and structure of the intervention. Tosteson et al. (1997) study educational
approaches to reduce cholesterol levels and find that costs per QALY vary from zero (cost
saving) to $38,000 per QALY. These studies generally conclude that educational inter-
ventions should be implemented on the basis of their cost effectiveness (a typical cost
threshold per QALY is $50,000). The next subsection begins specifying the model for
designing knowledge-based incentives.
5.2 Model Specification
5.2.1 Consumer Health and Behavior
The consumer’s health state is modeled using sub-states of total cholesterol (TC), high-
density lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol, and systolic blood pressure (BP), three major risk
factors for CHD. While still a significant abstraction from reality, this description of a
consumer’s health state extends the detail of many existing models in medical decision
making which primarily model disease states Briggs et al. (2006). In order to retain a
finite state space, each of these sub-health states are modeled as categorical variables.
The categorizations used, seen in Table 5.1 are adapted from Wilson et al. (1998) and
are similar to the definitions and guidelines from the Fifth Joint National Committee on
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Hypertension and the National Cholesterol Education Program. This categorization results
in 5×4×4 = 80 possible health states for the consumer.
Table 5.1
Categorization of Health States
Category BP (mm Hg) HDL (mg/dL) TC (mg/dL)
1 <130 ≥60 <160
2 130-139 45-59 160-199
3 140-159 35-44 200-239
4 ≥160 <35 240-279
5 - - ≥280
Consumer behavior is also modeled by three sub-behaviors: choosing a low saturated
fat diet, smoking, and getting a recommended level of exercise. Each sub-behavior is
modeled as a binary decision, leading to a total of 8 possible combined behaviors by the
consumer. The distinction of a low or high saturated fat diet is based on the percentage
of total calories consumed coming from saturated fat. Using American Heart Associ-
ation (AHA) guidelines, the recommended percentage is ≤ 10%. The AHA guideline
for physical activity is getting at least 150 minutes of moderate physical activity each
week. Each of the binary decisions is defined such that 0 represents the unhealthy choice,
and 1 represents the healthy choice. Using the logit stochastic choice rule on each sub-
behavior, and by normalizing the attraction sa=0 = 0 for each unhealthy sub-behavior, the
consumer’s attractions state can be reduced to three real numbers representing the attrac-
tions to sEXR=1,sFAT=1,sSMK=1.
In order to create a finite state space, the range of each attraction is bounded to [-
1.5,1.5] and approximated within this range by a 0.3-fine grid. As previously mentioned,
the attractions are invariant to the addition of a constant, so the location of this range has no
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effect other than the interpretation of costs previously discussed. The range of attractions
may seem small, however even an observed probability ratio of 90 can be approximated.
That is, suppose the most frequently observed behavior (say behavior i) has an empirical
probability of 0.9 and the least observed behavior ( j) has an empirical probability of 0.01.
Using the logit rule with a λ value of 3, the difference in attractions would be si− s j =
ln(0.9/0.01)/3 ≈ 1.5. Therefore, neither the range nor the location of the discretization
loses much generality. Increasing the fineness of the approximation grid would increases
the ability to accurately model behavioral change on behalf of consumers, but at the cost
of increased computational burden.
In order to model consumer behavior from attractions to each sub-behavior, one sim-
plifying assumption would be that consumers decide whether or not to smoke, to exercise,
and to consume a low fat diet independently. By comparison, this assumption seems at
least as plausible as the assumption that consumers are making decisions about all three
sub-behaviors simultaneously. Upon investigation, the assumption of behavioral inde-
pendence failed to hold, however the behaviors of diet and smoking were found to be
independent once conditioned on exercise behavior. An additive model of dependence
and conditional independence was developed and found to fit the data much better than
the assumption of independence. The details of this investigation and modeling are re-
ported in the Appendix. The additive model implemented allows the probabilities of each
sub-behavior to be computed using only knowledge of the consumer’s attraction to each
sub-behavior without assuming independence. This is desirable in order to save on the
size of the state space for computation.
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5.2.2 Consequences of CHD
Modeling acute events related to CHD is a challenging task. By AHA definitions, CHD
consists of ICD-9 disease classifications 410.x-414.x, which is comprised of a number of
conditions including the major categories of acute myocardial infarction (AMI), angina
pectoris, and ischemic heart disease. Accurate modeling, prediction and cost estimation of
these and other more detailed acute events is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead
a single acute event is modeled which represents the incidence of acute CHD.
5.2.3 Policy Maker Decisions and Rewards
The general framework using the EWA learning rule with knowledge parameters char-
acterizing policy decisions allows for distinct δ values for each behavior the consumer
might take. The policy maker’s decision of whether or not to provide knowledge about
the expected payoffs from each sub-behavior, is simplified to δ = (δEXR,δFAT ,δSMK) ∈
{0,1}3. The interpretation being that the policy maker will provide information about
the benefits and costs of smoking, diet, and exercise separately. Since the consumer sub-
behaviors are binary, choosing to provide knowledge conveys the expected payoffs of the
sub-behavior decision. That is, setting δSMK = 1 will update the consumer’s attraction to
smoke and to not smoke. This modeling feature could be generalized to allow for a policy
maker to decide for example how much funding to provide for a mass media campaign.
Relaxing this assumption would increase the already considerable computational burden
of the model, as well as take careful modeling of the varying effect of funding on mass
media campaigns, and is left for future research.
The policy maker’s decision determines whether or not the consumer receives payoff
knowledge about behaviors not chosen. Since healthcare consumers are likely unable
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to internalize their payoffs (including health related payoffs) for actions not chosen, one
alternative to the basic EWA setup is to set the payoff knowledge about actions not taken
equal to the expected payoff for the state-behavior pair, Π(a,x). This is problematic for
policy makers in reality and in this CHD model since exercise and diet have no short-term
impact on the risk of CHD. Therefore, the payoff knowledge the policy maker provides
is set to reflect costs ten years in the future given today’s health state and action chosen.
This time frame is chosen since shorter horizons may not yield significant differences in
health costs while longer horizons may lead to excessive discounting when interpreted by
consumers. One option would be to send information about the total expected costs of the
chosen behavior,
Γ(a,x) = Π(a,Ea,x[x(10)]),
where Ea,x[x(10)] is the expected health state in 10 years given today’s state and repeated
behavior. However, this function provides knowledge about direct costs which are rela-
tively well known to consumers, and also may not reflect favorably on healthy behaviors
(such as the cost of exercising). Furthermore, this choice of Γ provides different knowl-
edge to consumers based on their current behavior. Based on these concerns a more real-
istic modeling choice is to set
Γ(a,x) = [p(w = 1|a,Ea,xx(10))− p(w = 1|a′,Ea′,xx(10))]h(w),
where a′ represents the complement of a in whatever dimension knowledge is provided.
For example, if a = (aEXR,aFAT ,aSMK) = (1,1,0) and knowledge is provided regarding
exercise, then a′ = (0,1,0). This Γ function provides knowledge about health-based con-
sequences for the behavior chosen relative to the opposing behavior. This function also has
the appealing feature that Γ(a,x) = −Γ(a′,x), so that all consumers hear the same mes-
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sage. Consumers with healthy behavior will receive positive knowledge, while consumers
with unhealthy behavior will receive negative knowledge. Providing this payoff infor-
mation allows the policy maker to deter unhealthy behaviors related to diet and exercise
despite the lack of short term consequences.
The policy maker’s cost is modeled as proportional to the number of sub-behaviors for
which knowledge is provided,
C(δ) = k(δEXRPM +δFATPM +δSMKPM ).
The constant k, reflecting the cost per consumer of providing knowledge, will vary depend-
ing on the size and distribution of the population. Since national averages have been used
as inputs for parameters, the $130 million spent on the 2010 U.S. Census campaign for a
cost of roughly $.43 per individual is used as a baseline estimate of the cost of providing
knowledge to an individual. The sensitivity of the results to this and other parameters is
investigated later. The policy maker’s objective is assumed to be minimizing the total ex-
pected costs of both CHD consequences and providing knowledge. Thus rewards in each
period are given by
r(st ,xt ,δt) = Eω[h(ω)+C(δt)] =C(δt)+ ∑
a∈|A |
∑
ω∈Ω
h(ω)p(ω|a,xt)p(a|st).
5.3 Parameter Estimation
5.3.1 Health Transition Probabilities
The state transition probabilities are an important part of the model. By modeling
the health state and behavior using three sub-components each, the accuracy and descrip-
tiveness of the model has improved, but also have significantly increased the number of
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transition probabilities to estimate. The currently specified model consists of 80 health
states and 8 behaviors for a total of 51,200 possible state-state-action tuples. In order to
estimate these transition probabilities, the ARIC data which contains cohort data on indi-
viduals with detailed information about behavior and health status over time is used. The
data provides 20,604 state-state-action transitions with which to estimate the transition
probabilities. A flexible parametric model is used with maximum likelihood estimation
to compute the transition probabilities, without making unnecessarily strong assumptions
such as probabilistic independence of sub-transitions. Details of the parametric model and
estimation procedure can be found in the Appendix.
5.3.2 Behavioral and Health Costs
The cost of smoking is estimated by the consumption of the average smoker, a pack a
day, for a cost of $1,825 per year at $5 per pack. The cost of getting the recommended level
of exercise is not as clear, since most individuals get some exercise in their daily routine.
The additional physical activity needed for an individual currently not meeting the AHA
guidelines is estimated from the ARIC data and multiplied by the median wage rate to
estimate the incremental cost of getting enough exercise per week. This cost comes to
$1,888 per year for the average under-exercising individual who needs to increase activity
by 136.6 minutes per week at a cost of $15.95 per hour, the median U.S. wage rate (Bureau
of Labors Statistics, 2009). Accurately estimating the cost of eating a diet with less than
10% of calories coming from saturated fat is more difficult still. Diets vary greatly between
regions of the country and socioeconomic groups. Food groups such as ground beef seem
to indicate that a diet with less fat would be more expensive, since lean meat is more
expensive than fatty meat. Other foods, milk for example suggest otherwise as skim milk is
not more expensive than 2% or whole milk. Carlson et al. (2007) study whether or not it is
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feasible to maintain a healthy and nutritious diet on a budget equal to that of the maximum
food stamp allotment. Carlson and colleagues use prices paid by low-income people for
food, consider the cost and nutrients of foods as-consumed (including preparation and
cooking), and take an objective of minimizing deviations from current dietary habits to
avoid bizarre recommendations. The conclusions of their study find that is feasible for each
of 15 age-gender groups to achieve the 2005 Dietary Guidelines for Americans, including
a diet with less than 10% of calories from saturated fat, on a minimal budget. Given that
consumers can choose a nutritious low fat diet on a minimal budget, the direct cost of
choosing a diet with less than 10% of calories from saturated fat is set to zero. The fact
that many consumers prefer fat in their diet will be captured through the attractions.
The cost of this acute event is set to $10,000, approximately the average cost of CHD
for Americans in 2010, and a lower bound on the reported average costs of more specific
diagnoses ($14,009 for AMI, $12,977 for coronary atherosclerosis, and $10,630 for other
ischemic heart disease Lloyd-Jones et al. (2010)). From the policy maker’s perspective,
this simplification makes little sacrifice, since the population of consumers will have a
variety of acute CHD symptoms, and this average cost of treatment will represent the total
consequences across consumers. Also, from the consumer’s perspective, it seems plausible
that any form of acute CHD would be enough to modify behavior, considering the relative
cost of CHD to the behavioral costs and preferences. This interpretation can be seen in
the model since whether the patient experiences a AMI, coronary atherosclerosis, or some
other acute CHD diagnosis, the EWA model predicts the attraction to chosen behaviors
becoming very small.
Each period represents one year. In order to calculate the 1-year probability of CHD
from each health state-behavior pair, the prediction model of D’Agostino et al. (2000) is
used. These authors incorporate the health factors considered in this model, and use data
from the the Framingham Heart Study (Truett et al. (1967), www.framinghamheartstudy.
61
org) to fit a parametric model predicting the risk of CHD within a 1-4 year span based on
systolic blood pressure, HDL cholesterol, and total cholesterol along with several other
factors. Variables in the D’Agostino et al. model that are not captured in the state space or
behavior in this model are entered at the population average level.
5.3.3 Learning Rule Parameters
Although it has been estimated for a variety of decision situations, EWA has not been
estimated within a healthcare decision context. The parameter φ is set to 1.0, which is con-
sistent with empirical estimates from other decision paradigms (Camerer and Ho, 1999).
Setting φ < 1 typically prevents attractions from growing without bound, but since the at-
tractions in the model described are renormalized each period, this issue is not a concern.
Since the consumer represents an aggregate consumer of the policy maker’s population,
with older individuals leaving the population and young individuals entering, The experi-
ence of the consumer is modeled as constant over time. Any level of experience can be
considered while maintaining the assumption of constant population experience by setting
ρ = (N−1)/N. The value of experience, N determines the weighting of new information
(payoffs and knowledge) relative to historical attractions in computing new attractions.
New information is given a weight of 1/N. The range of values of experience used in
computations reflect the literature on how healthcare consumers make decisions, which
reports that consumers ‘give priority to their personal experience’ (Moser et al., 2010),
and that many consumers will not use information in decision making (Hibbard et al.,
1997). Since the experience parameter controls the behavior change of consumers, it will
be a focus of the sensitivity analysis to validate the model.
In order to choose an estimate for λ, evidence found in Camerer et al. (2002) is
used. Camerer et al. estimate EWA parameters from a pooled data set of a variety of
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games including patent race, continental divide, median action, p-beauty contest, trav-
eler’s dilemma, and pot games. Their pooled estimate of λ is 2.95. Recall that λ ∈
[0,∞) represents the ability or propensity of consumers to select more attractive actions.
For example, if a consumer has an attraction to smoking of 0 (sSMK=0 = 0), and an at-
traction to not smoking of 1 (sSMK=1 = 1), then λ = {0,1,3.5.10} ⇒ p(SMK = 1) =
{0.5,0.731,0.950,0.993,0.999}. Two factors present in healthcare consumers that would
tend to increase λ from 0 (uniform randomization) are the lack of tendencies to explore and
experience in the decision environment. In light of these factors, Camerer et al.’s pooled
estimate appears reasonable.
5.4 Model Validation
In order to validate the model for prescribing knowledge provision policies, the model
is scaled down to consider only smoking behavior. This strategy is taken since the full
model is computationally expensive to run and this smaller version allows a more complete
validation. and gives some credibility to the larger model since the model is quite similar
for each sub-behavior. Figure 5.1 shows the structure of the optimal policy as attraction
and health states and experience vary. The black cells show the attraction and health state
combinations at each experience level for which the policy maker’s cost minimizing deci-
sion is to provide knowledge about the benefits of not smoking. The highlighted window
shows the policy information conveyed at each attraction-experience combination. Recall
that the health states are ordered from most to least healthy, so the threshold policy seen
in the highlight pair, when N = 50, and sSMK = 2, shows a policy in which it is optimal
to provide knowledge to the least healthy consumers. At the boundaries, as experience
goes to zero or becomes large, the model exhibits the expected behavior. That is, as expe-
rience decreases, consumer place increasing weight on new information through payoffs
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Figure 5.1. Optimal Policy for Smoking Knowledge Provision. High-
lighted at s = 2, Experience = 50
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and knowledge. Thus as experience goes to zero, consumers easily change their behavior
when presented with knowledge about the expected health benefits of not smoking. In
this case, providing knowledge is optimal at all attraction and health states. Analogously,
as experience grows, consumers place increasing weight on their historical attractions and
less weight on new information. As experience becomes large enough, no behavior change
arises from information provided, and costly knowledge provision is clearly sub-optimal.
This prediction is realized seen in Figure 5.1 as experience reaches 170.
Sensitivity to the cost of smoking, the cost of providing knowledge, and the consumer’s
cost of an acute CHD event were also tested. Figure 5.2 shows how the states which are
cost effective to provide knowledge in decreases as the cost of providing knowledge in-
creases. The black region shows which states providing knowledge is the optimal deci-
sion if providing knowledge costs $5.00 per individual per year. The dark gray region
shows which additional states have cost saving knowledge provision if the cost of provid-
ing knowledge is $2.00. The light gray region shows the additional states which make up
Figure 5.1, where the cost of providing knowledge is $0.43. Sensitivity was performed
with respect to the consumer’s cost of an acute CHD event to simulate consumer’s insur-
ance from financial risk. The policy maker’s cost of an acute CHD event was left at the full
cost of $10,000, while the consumer’s cost was set varied between $10,000, $5,000, and
$2,000. The optimal policies were found to be relatively constant in the consumer’s cost
of CHD on the range of experiences where providing knowledge is interesting. Finally,
one result worth explaining is the feature that as experience rises, the first consumers to
leave the optimal policy are those who are most likely to smoke. This result seems counter
intuitive as those consumers would be the ones most in need of knowledge. This artifact
of the optimal policy exists because of the fact that consumers who smoke experience the
direct costs of smoking, and negatively impact their attraction to smoking. The consumer’s
cost of smoking was varied to investigate the possibility that consumer’s are addicted or
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Figure 5.2. Optimal Smoking Knowledge Provision Policies by Cost of
Knowledge. k = {0.43 (Light gray),2 (Dark gray), 5 (Black)}
have internalized the cost of smoking. The results show that as the cost of smoking de-
creases, more knowledge should be provided to these most addicted smokers. This result
agrees with the intuition that if smoking is very cheap, a policy maker cannot rely on di-
rect costs alone to deter consumers from smoking. While the model exhibits the behavior
which agrees with intuition and exhibits appropriate boundary behavior, in order to fully
validate the model, experiments would need to be designed and performed for the partic-
ular population of consumers at hand. The design of such experiments is discussed in the
following.
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5.4.1 Ideal Validation: Design of Experiments
In order for a policy maker to have full confidence in the results of the model, exper-
iments would need to be designed to estimate parameters more accurately. Parameters
of particular interest are those of the learning rule (φ,λ,N) which model attractions and
behavioral change in consumers, and the costs of each type of behavior as perceived by
consumers. Prior to designing experiments, the model presented in this section could give
a policy maker a sense of the value of information of a certain parameter. For example,
consider the optimal policies from Figure 5.1. If a policy maker were fairly certain that the
experience of the population under consideration had an experience between 60 and 100,
the value of experimentation to determine the precise experience of the population would
be of little value. This can be seen since the optimal policy governing what states should
be provided smoking knowledge is quite constant over this range of experiences. On the
other hand, a prior belief on the range of 100 to 150 could create a significant value of
experimentation.
Estimation of learning rule parameters can be accomplished through maximum likeli-
hood or minimum deviation procedures Cabrales and Garcia Fontes (2000); Camerer et al.
(2002). A group of participants could be randomly assigned to both control and treatment
groups where the treatment group receives knowledge about the expected consequences
of health behaviors. This treatment could be specifically administered to treatment group
participants through electronic and paper media. By taking repeated measurements of at-
tractions to health behaviors and reported behaviors, the parameters could be estimated
for the cohort of experiment participants. Attractions to behaviors should be measured in
both absolute (e.g. through a willingness-to-pay assessment) and categorical scales (e.g.
{0,1, . . . ,10}). In order to accurately estimate these parameters, care must be taken to en-
sure that the treatment and control groups are representative of the population which is be-
67
ing considered for the intervention. This can be aided by stratifying the experiment groups
for important possible confounding variables such as age, education, and income. Even
if the groups are representative, unobserved heterogeneity can lead to bias in estimation
of learning parameters Cabrales and Garcia Fontes (2000). In light of the heterogeneity
of healthcare consumers, this may be a concern in estimating healthcare learning parame-
ters. Cabrales and Garcia Fontes (2000) discuss estimating the distribution of parameters
in order to deal with this bias.
In order to support the experimental evidence, quasi-experiments should also be de-
signed. These experiments do not randomly assign participants to treatment groups, but
rather the intervention could be administered to a treatment population and a control pop-
ulation. These populations would need to be measured for prevalence of the health behav-
iors identified both before and after the treatment period in order to observe the change
in behavior due to the educational intervention. The treatment and control populations
would likely be similar communities, closely matched on a number of factors which could
be confounding factors to the treatment effect. These factors would include distribution
of age, education, income, initial behavior prevalence, and geography. Geography is a
challenge factor to control for because of the trade offs involved with proximity. Too
great proximity would tend to produce significant climatological and cultural differences
between the populations, while too small of a proximity would be difficult to ensure that
the treatment is not having a peripheral effect on the control group. Even after controlling
for these factors, other threats to the internal validity of such quasi-experiments include
differences population history and predisposition and differences in population dynamics
over the experimentation period.
A challenge in measuring the behavior prevalence is that self-reporting through surveys
or interviews would be cheapest measurement tool. In the case of reporting the level of
exercise or the percent of calories consumed from saturated fat, the experiment participants
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may forget or simply not know what the true response should be. Additionally, all three
healthy sub-behaviors may tend to be over-reported because of a social desirability bias.
Smoking can be tested for through nicotine tests, however exercise and diet are more
difficult behaviors to definitively assess. More precise information about model parameters
could lead a policy maker or payer to better decisions about when to provide knowledge
to consumers. Experiments to estimate parameters which control for potential biases and
confounding factors such as those discussed here can provide decision makers with the
information needed. The next subsection discusses the results from the full model for
providing knowledge regarding exercise, diet, and smoking.
5.5 Results
The full model is solved by a parallelized value iteration algorithm. With such a large
model, the results can be challenging to interpret. The results are presented with the pa-
rameter settings established earlier. The results for smoking knowledge provision are quite
similar to the results presented earlier, with thresholds determining which consumers are
sick enough to warrant knowledge about their smoking behavior. There is some interac-
tion between the optimal policy for smoking and the attractions to other behaviors. As
consumers become attracted to exercising and low-fat diets, some health states drop out of
the optimal policy for smoking.
Very few health and attraction states yield a cost savings from providing knowledge
about exercise or low-fat diet behavior. Knowledge about diet should be provided to non-
smokers, who are attracted to high-fat diets. Within this set, knowledge is valuable to
consumers with low blood pressure and total cholesterol, but high HDL cholesterol. See
Figure 5.3, which shows a piece of the optimal policy at (sEXR,sFAT ,sSMK) = (4,2,10),
where each cell entry is read as a tuple (δEXR,δFAT ,δSMK), and in this table the cells in
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which providing knowledge about diets is optimal are highlighted. Examining the transi-
Figure 5.3. Optimal Diet Knowledge at s = (4,2,10)
tion probabilities between health states per diet behavior reveals that a low saturated fat
diet is most useful in lowering HDL cholesterol states (raising HDL cholesterol), and less
so for other health sub-states. This result driven by the data makes sense because satu-
rated fat is not the only major dietary control of blood pressure (sodium) and because a
unsaturated fats can raise HDL levels. Therefore the results show that the health-attraction
combinations where providing knowledge about a low saturated fat diet are few, and in-
clude non-smokers who could improve their diets, but whose health isn’t already too poor
to help.
The results for exercise knowledge provision are similar to those for diet. See Figure
5.4, which shows the optimal policy at (sEXR,sFAT ,sSMK) = (3,5,10), and the cells where
providing knowledge about exercise is cost saving are highlighted. Again knowledge goes
to healthy non-smokers who have room to improve their health state. One curious result
here is that exercise knowledge is not provided at health state (BP,HDL,TC) = (1,4,1),
while it is at both (1,3,1) and (1,4,2). The flexible approach to estimating transition
probabilities makes the exact source of this gap hard to identify. The change in the policy
from (1,4,1) to (1,4,2), where providing knowledge becomes optimal could be explained
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Figure 5.4. Optimal Exercise Knowledge at s = (3,5,10)
by the increased opportunity to improve health. The change from (1,3,1) to (1,4,1) is
harder to explain. One explanation that is partially supported by the data is if consumers
in HDL state 4 are less likely to improve their HDL health. At first these seems unlikely
since consumers in HDL state 4 have very low HDL counts, and therefore have significant
room to improve. However, the fact that they are so low in HDL, makes it more likely that
family history and genetics are contributing to the low HDL count, and that exercise is less
likely to aid in this regard.
The results conclude that providing knowledge and diet behavior is rarely cost saving.
Although this result would seem to contradict the increasing occurrence of these types of
education and knowledge in media today, several factors may explain the difference. First,
cost-effectiveness is likely a motivation for existing health education initiatives whereas
this study has considered cost savings. A second and related factor is that this study
models costs stemming from CHD only. Diet and exercise have less immediate effect
on preventing acute CHD events than smoking behavior, thus the benefits of improved
behavior are discounted. Poor diet and exercise behavior would likely lead to increased
costs and decreased quality of life due to other diseases as well (e.g. diabetes). Finally, the
model is somewhat limited by the health state categorizations and the input data. The less
structured form of the exercise and diet policies tend to suggest the results may be more
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tied to the state and behavior specifications and data. As can be seen from the correlations
in the Appendix, the effects of healthy exercise and diet behavior on health transitions
are the hardest to identify. Likely the granularity of the state categorization and noise
in the data contribute to this complication. Whether the effect is truly noisy, or if the
techniques used here can be significantly improved on, the effect is that a policy maker
is less certain about the benefits of change consumer behavior in these dimensions. By
modeling the effects of behavior on health in more sophisticated ways, and modeling total
healthcare costs stemming from the health and attraction states, providing knowledge for
these behaviors will become a better investment for a payer.
5.5.1 Future Extensions
Even just considering CHD, this model could be extended in many ways, to incor-
porate more of the vast information available on CHD. One example would be through
differentiating knowledge between groups of the public. D’Agostino et al. (2000) provide
gender specific CHD risk models. Presumably the optimal knowledge that should be pro-
vided for women would differ from that of men. If a policy maker could reliably choose
knowledge paths to differentiate the knowledge presented to men and women, one-size fits
all policies could be improved upon. Other extensions could include costs to consumers of
acute CHD events above the direct financial costs due to pain and suffering. If this cost or
disutility could be reliably estimated it could be incorporated in the total cost of an acute
CHD event. This could be an important feature to model if consumers have very generous
insurance eliminating the financial costs of acute events. Another interesting extension
would be to consider community or herd influences on behavior in the population. This
feature could be implemented by extending the learning rule and state space to consider
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attractions to behaviors of the individual as well as the community. While interesting this
extension would enlarge an already burdensome state space.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
While operation practices will continue to be refined over and over, real efficiency
gains in healthcare and other distributed systems must tackle the problem of controlling
strategic behavior. This dissertation provided answers and analytical techniques to ques-
tions of how incentives should be designed in healthcare systems. Two types of incen-
tives were considered: financial incentives constructed through insurance and remunera-
tion contracts, and knowledge-based incentives for behavioral change.
The first problem considered the implications of interacting preventive efforts on be-
half of consumers and providers. Optimal multilateral contracts show a distortion from the
benchmark of the bilateral contract, and showed that consumers and providers must both
be better off when a consumer is healthy as opposed to ill to exert preventive efforts. This
feature of the optimal contracts has been suggested as a feature of new payment systems
to improve system incentives (Antos et al., 2009). On the consumer side, this character-
istic is common in policies with copays and coinsurance rates. The provider’s incentives
must be designed such that his payments ensure his reservation level of utility, but also
make the desired level of effort his best choice. Achieving the balance of payments and
incentives requires a mixed remuneration contract of prospective payments, retrospective
payments, and bonuses for good health outcomes of consumers. This finding to control ex
ante moral hazard strengthens the literature which recommends mixed incentives to solve
various agency problems ex post, and extends the support for mixed provider incentives
when such ex post concerns are negligible. To implement such a scheme, there would need
to be some association between the consumer and a specific provider with responsibility
for the particular condition under contract. Accountable care organizations and medical
home arrangements are two examples where such conditions would exist.
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The second problem investigated when should knowledge be provided to consumers to
affect health behaviors, and subsequently health states and costs. The methodology used
relaxed the strong assumption of expected utility maximization on behalf of healthcare
consumers, and considers system dynamics, an improvement on the majority of incentives
literature which uses static frameworks. The decision to provide knowledge or not was
modeled as an MDP from a policy maker or payers and solved via a parallelized value it-
eration algorithm. The policies regularly showed threshold structures in which knowledge
is only cost-saving when provided to sicker consumers. The model was validated to some
extent through sensitivity analysis and boundary behavior, and a more thorough validation
through design experiments was discussed.
Incentives can be constructed through a variety of tools and for a range of strategic
behaviors to be controlled. Financial incentives for preventive efforts from consumers
and providers and knowledge-based incentives for health behavior from consumers were
considered here independently. Future work on incentives will likely include these mecha-
nisms as well as other policy tools, and consider these participants in addition to hospitals
and technology companies. Even more complex models could consider the interaction of
financial, knowledge-based, and other incentives to jointly optimize incentive problems.
By doing so, healthcare systems can hope to find significant cost savings through strategic
behavior of system participants.
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APPENDIX A
Properties of eC(·) with Complementary Efforts
Claim: ∂eC(eP;∆u)∂eP = e
′
C(eP;∆u)≥ 0.
Proof: In (3.2), replace eC by eC(eP;∆u), then (3.2) becomes
pi′(eC(eP;∆u))∆u =
∂ψ
∂eC
(eC(eP;∆u),eP).
Taking derivatives with respect to eP gives
pi′′(eC(eP;∆u))e′C(eP;∆u)∆u =
∂2ψ
∂e2C
(eC(eP;∆u),eP)e′C(eP;∆u)+
∂2ψ
∂eC∂eP
(eC(eP;∆u),eP)
Rearranging gives
e′C(eP;∆u) =
∂2ψ
∂eC∂eP (eC(eP;∆u),eP)[
pi′′(eC(eP;∆u))∆u− ∂2ψ∂e2C (eC(eP;∆u),eP)
] = −
(−)(+)− (+) ≥ 0
Claim: ∂eC(eP;∆u)∂∆u ≥ 0.
Proof: Again (3.2) gives that
pi′(eC(eP;∆u))∆u =
∂ψ
∂eC
(eC(eP;∆u),eP).
Taking derivatives with respect to ∆u gives
pi′′(eC(eP;∆u))
∂eC(eP;∆u)
∂∆u ∆u+pi
′(eC(eP;∆u)) =
∂2ψ
∂e2C
(eC(eP;∆u),eP)
∂eC(eP;∆u)
∂∆u
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Solving for ∂eC(eP;∆u)∂∆u yields
∂eC(eP;∆u)
∂∆u =
pi′(·)
∂2ψ(·)
∂e2C
−pi′′(·)∆u
=
+
(+) − (−)(+) ≥ 0.
Concavity of IC Constraints
The consumer’s IC constraint (3.3.1) is clearly concave since
∂2
∂e2C
[pi(eˆC)uh +[1−pi(eˆC)]ui−ψ(eˆC,eP)] = pi′′(·)∆u− ∂
2ψ(·)
∂e2C
= (−)− (+)≤ 0.
Considering the provider’s IC constraint (3.3.1),
∂2
∂e2P
[
pi(eC(eˆP;∆u))tPh +[1−pi(eC(eˆP;∆u))](tPi −d)− cP(eˆP)
]
=
[
pi′′(·)(e′C(·))2 +pi′(·)e′′C(·)
]
(∆tP +d)− c′′P(·) = [(−)(+)+(+)(?)](+)− (+),
where the unknown sign comes from e′′C(·). If this sign is negative, the provider’s IC
constraint is concave. The reason that e′C(·) ≥ 0 is that the provider’s effort is lowers
consumer disutility, and thus aids in inducing consumer effort. Since the benefits from
provider effort are assumed to be decreasing, it is expected that e′′C(·)≤ 0. More rigorously,
it was previously found that
e′C(eP;∆u) =
∂2ψ
∂eC∂eP (eC(eP;∆u),eP)[
pi′′(eC(eP;∆u))∆u− ∂2ψ∂e2C (eC(eP;∆u),eP)
]
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Denote the numerator (denominator) of this expression by † (‡), which are both negative.
Then,
e′′C(·) =
(
1
‡2
)([ ∂3ψ
∂e2C∂eP
e′C(·)+
∂3ψ
∂eC∂e2P
]
‡−
[
pi′′′(·)e′C(·)∆u−
∂3ψ
∂e2C∂eP
− ∂
3ψ
∂e3C
e′C(·)
]
†
)
Then since e′C(·)≥ 0 and ∂
3ψ(·)
∂eC∂e2P
≥ 0, the following technical conditions (A.1) are sufficient
for the provider’s IC constraint to be concave.
pi′′′(·)≤ 0
∂3ψ(·)
∂e2C∂eP
≥ 0
∂3ψ(·)
∂e3C
≥ 0
(A.1)
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
Previously it was found that
e′C(eP;∆u) =
∂2ψ
∂eC∂eP (eC(eP;∆u),eP)[
pi′′(eC(eP;∆u))∆u− ∂2ψ∂e2C (eC(eP;∆u),eP)
] .
Now taking the derivative with respect to ∆u, (again using the same †,‡ notation for the
numerator and denominator, which are both negative)
∂e′C(·)
∂∆u =
(
1
‡2
)[( ∂3ψ(·)
∂e2C∂eP
∂eC(·)
∂∆u
)
‡−
(
pi′′(·)+pi′′′(·)∂eC(·)∂∆u ∆u−
∂3ψ(·)
∂e3C
∂eC(·)
∂∆u
)
†
]
.
The term in the brackets needs to be examined. By the previous conditions (A.1), the signs
of terms within the brackets are
(+)(+)(−)− [(−)+(−)(+)− (+)(+)](−)≤ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
Differentiating and adding a positive term to the right hand side, gives that
∂
∂eC
(
pi′eC(·)
pi′eP(·)
)
≤ 0 ⇒
pi′′
e2C
pi′eP −pi′′eCePpi′eC
(pi′eP)
2 ≤ 0 ⇒
pi′′
e2C
pi′eP −pi′′eCePpi′eC
(pi′eP)
2 ≤
ψ′′
∆u ·pi′eP
.
Rearranging terms gives that
pi′eP ≥ pi′eC
∆u ·pi′′eCeP
∆u ·pi′′
e2C
−ψ′′ .
Finally substituting in ∂eC∂eP gives
pi′eC
∂eC
∂eP
+pi′eP ≥ 0.
Therefore, if ∆v≤ 0, the provider maximizes utility by setting effort equal to 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3
Substituting in ∂eC∂eP =
∆u·pi′′eCeP
ψ′′−∆u·pi′′
e2C
transforms the bracketed term in equations (3.26) and
(3.26) into [(
pi′′eCeP ·ψ′′
ψ′′−∆u ·pi′′
e2C
)
∂eC
∂∆u +pi
′
eC
∂2eC
∂eP∂∆u
]
Under the assumptions on pi(ec,eP), and the second stipulation of the proposition, this
term is negative. The first stipulation of the proposition ensure the sign of γ is consistent
with Corollary 3.3.1, and the result follows from the form of equations (3.26) and (3.26).
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Sensitivity Analysis of Multilateral Savings
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Figure A.1. Sensitivity to a with b = 0.20. a = {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5},
(b,d,q,r,w)=(0.20,5,0.05,0.10,50)
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Figure A.2. Sensitivity to a with b = 0.25. a = {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5},
(b,d,q,r,w)=(0.25,5,0.05,0.10,50)
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Figure A.3. Sensitivity to a with b = 0.35. a = {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5},
(b,d,q,r,w)=(0.35,5,0.05,0.10,50)
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Figure A.4. Sensitivity to a with b = 0.40. a = {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5},
(b,d,q,r,w)=(0.40,5,0.05,0.10,50)
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Figure A.5. Sensitivity to a with b = 0.45. a = {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5},
(b,d,q,r,w)=(0.45,5,0.05,0.10,50)
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Figure A.6. Sensitivity to a with b = 0.50. a = {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5},
(b,d,q,r,w)=(0.50,5,0.05,0.10,50)
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Figure A.7. Sensitivity to r with q = 0.03.
r = {0.05,0.075,0.10,0.125,0.15}, (a,b,d,q,w)=(0.30,0.30,5,0.03,50)
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Figure A.8. Sensitivity to r with q = 0.04.
r = {0.05,0.075,0.10,0.125,0.15}, (a,b,d,q,w)=(0.30,0.30,5,0.04,50)
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Figure A.9. Sensitivity to r with q = 0.05.
r = {0.05,0.075,0.10,0.125,0.15}, (a,b,d,q,w)=(0.30,0.30,5,0.05,50)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1m  0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
k
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1m  0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
k
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1m  0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
k
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1m  0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
k
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1m  0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
k
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
97
Figure A.10. Sensitivity to r with q = 0.06.
r = {0.05,0.075,0.10,0.125,0.15}, (a,b,d,q,w)=(0.30,0.30,5,0.06,50)
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Figure A.11. Sensitivity to r with q = 0.07.
r = {0.05,0.075,0.10,0.125,0.15}, (a,b,d,q,w)=(0.30,0.30,5,0.07,50)
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APPENDIX B
Behavioral Dependence
The data used in this appendix is a subsample of the Atherosclerosis Risk In Communi-
ties (ARIC) data, cleaned for missing data, from a single time period, so that independence
between the observations is reasonably assumed. The data consists of 10,309 individuals
who choose to exercise (E1) or not (E0), consume a low (F1) or high (F0) fat diet, and
smoke (S0) or not (S1). Table B.1 provides a summary table of the data.
Table B.1
Summary of ARIC Behavioral Data. pr(E1) = .46, pr(F1) = .24, pr(S1) = .79
E0 E1
S0 S1 S0 S1
F0 1054 3323 F0 641 2817
F1 264 913 F1 207 1090
The first tests performed were χ2 tests for independence. For n×n contingency tables,
the test statistic
χ2 = ∑
i, j
(Oi j− Êi j)2/Êi j,
where Oi j is the observed frequency of cell i j, and Êi j is the expected frequency of cell
i j based on the marginal probabilities of i and j, has the χ2 distribution with 1 degree
of freedom. Low p-values would lead to reject the null hypothesis of independence. In-
dependence was tested for between all three pairs of behaviors at three levels each (3rd
variable = 0, 3rd variable = 1, combined across 3rd variable). These tests are performed
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in R (where the Yates’ continuity correction is automatically performed) and verified via
spreadsheet. Table B.2 details the results.
Table B.2
χ2 Tests for Independence
Test Pair 3rd Level χ2 p-value
FS 0 1.3064 0.2530
FS 1 4.1001 0.04288
FS C 7.4779 0.006246
ES 0 34.6925 3.861e-09
ES 1 16.3409 5.291e-05
ES C 53.3189 2.836e-13
EF 0 5.5629 0.01834
EF 1 43.7788 3.677e-11
EF C 51.6666 6.577e-13
The relationship between fat and smoking is the only pair for which the null hypothe-
sis of independence is not easily rejected. Two more tests based on the odds-ratio, the
Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel (CMH) test, and the Mantel-Haenszel (MH) test, were per-
formed to check for conditional independence. In data where there is more than two
variables, these tests check for conditional independence (CMH) and the strength of asso-
ciation (MH). The procedure cmh.test() in R computes the CMH test and MH stat, sum-
marized in Table B.3.
Here again, there is some evidence of conditional independence between diet and
smoking, as the null hypothesis fails to be rejected at the 0.02 significance level.
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Table B.3
CMH Tests for Independence
Test Pair CMH stat p-value MH OR pooled OR 3rd=0 OR 3rd=1 OR
FS 5.126 0.024 1.141 1.174 1.097 1.198
ES 51.133 0.000 1.422 1.434 1.394 1.523
EF 49.417 0.000 1.385 1.395 1.289 1.408
Models of Dependence for Prediction
Each sub-behavior is modeled as a 0-1 variable with 1 representing the healthy choice.
The purpose of modeling dependence is to predict probabilities of each type of combined
behavior (e.g. exercising, high-fat diet, no smoking) from just three attractions, one for
each sub-behavior. Using only three inputs keeps the state space manageable for solving
the MDP iteratively. The relationship between attractions and probabilities is computed
through the logit rule, where given a set of actions, A , and attractions sa, a ∈ A , the
probability of choosing an action is given by
pr(a) =
eλ · sa
∑
a′∈A
eλ·sa′
.
Using the logit rule to translates attractions into probabilities, there are two ways which
dependence could be incorporated: through the probabilities directly, or through with the
attractions. This concept can be seen in Figure B.1.
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Figure B.1. Dependence Pathways
Before modeling dependence, notice that assuming independence between the sub-
behaviors implies that EiFj = Ei +Fj, that is, the interaction 2© is additive. Since this
function makes the following chain of equalities true.
pr(EiFj) =
e
λ·sEiFj
eλ·sE0F0 + eλ·sE0F1 + eλ·sE1F0 + eλ·sE1F1
(B.1)
=
eλ·sEi eλ·sFj
(eλ·sE0 + eλ·sE1 )(eλ·sF0 + eλ·sF1 )
(B.2)
= pr(Ei) · pr(Fj) (B.3)
Conditional Independence - Additive Dependence (CIAD)
The first pathway to model dependence is pathway 1©. Since the tests have shown that
independence does not hold, the three marginal probabilities cannot simply be multiplied
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together to get a joint probability. However, the tests have shown evidence that conditional
on exercise, fat and smoking are independent.
pr(EiFjSk) = pr(Ei) · pr(FjSk|Ei) = pr(Ei) · pr(Fj|Ei) · pr(Sk|Ei) (B.4)
The question then becomes how to model pr(F |E) 6= pr(F). Note also that care must be
taken to ensure the probabilities are always non-negative, and sum to 1 when appropriate.
The first approach introduced is an additive effects model.
pr(F1|E1) = pr(F1)+αF1|E1
pr(F0|E1) = pr(F0)−αF1|E1
pr(F1|E0) = pr(F1)+αF1|E0
pr(F0|E0) = pr(F0)−αF1|E0
pr(S1|E1) = pr(S1)+αS1|E1
pr(S0|E1) = pr(S0)−αS1|E1
pr(S1|E0) = pr(S1)+αS1|E0
pr(S0|E0) = pr(S0)−αS1|E0
All the α values here are easily estimated from the data. For example, α̂F1|E1 = p̂r(F1|E1)−
p̂r(F1). Performing these computations leads to α̂F1|E1 = 0.0328, α̂S1|E1 = 0.0318, α̂F1|E0 =
−0.0281, α̂S1|E0 =−0.0272. It is interesting that α̂F1|E1 ≈ α̂S1|E1 ≈−α̂F1|E0 ≈−α̂S1|E0 ≈
.03. The only concern about the meaningfulness of the probabilities would be if pr(Ei), pr(S j) /∈
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[.03, .97], which would lead to negative and higher than 1 probabilities. Based on these
α values, the conditional independence - additive dependence model can be used to pre-
dict occurrences of each type of behavior. Evidence for the goodness-of-fit of this model is
presented after introducing a conditional independence - multiplicative dependence model.
Conditional Independence - Multiplicative Dependence (CIMD)
Another approach for modeling pr(F|E) 6= pr(F) would be a multiplicative approach,
pr(F |E) = β · pr(F). In order to do this, extra care must be taken to ensure the meaning-
fulness of the probabilities. To tackle this problem, it can be observed from the data and
from the additive approach that when i 6= j, pr(Fi|E j) < pr(Fi) and similarly for smok-
ing. This would result in a value of β < 1. This insight proves useful since a prob-
ability multiplied by a scalar less than 1 is still in [0,1]. Then for the other behavior,
pr(Fj|E j) = 1− pr(Fi|E j). Using this model, there are 4 β values to estimate
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pr(F1|E1) = 1− pr(F0|E1)
pr(F0|E1) = βF0|E1 · pr(F0)
pr(F1|E0) = βF1|E0 · pr(F1)
pr(F0|E0) = 1− (F1|E0)
pr(S1|E1) = 1− pr(S0|E1)
pr(S0|E1) = βS0|E1 · pr(S0)
pr(S1|E0) = βS1|E0 · pr(S1)
pr(S0|E0) = 1− pr(S1|E0)
Again, all the β values are estimable from the data, resulting in β̂F0|E1 = .96, β̂F1|E0 =
.88, β̂S0|E1 = .85, and β̂S1|E0 = .97. This multiplicative model is guaranteed to produce
meaningful probabilities. Now both the CIAD and CIMD models are used to predict
outcomes, judging both versus the real data, with independence (IND) as a benchmark,
the results are reported in Table B.4, where the sum of squared deviations (SSD) measures
differences from observed counts.
It appears each dependence model predicts the data much better than pure indepen-
dence. The additive approach fairs slightly better, and is appealing in that all four α values
are the same, but has a small concern of inconsistent probabilities. The 10,309 observa-
tions composing the full data set are split to form a training data set (≈ 80%) and a testing
set (≈ 20%). The training set was used to estimate the α’s and β’s, and the testing set
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Table B.4
Comparing Conditional Independence Models
Behavior Data IND CIAD CIMD
000 1054 888 1055 1026
001 3323 3342 3342 3365
010 264 281 281 275
011 913 1055 888 901
100 641 757 623 618
101 2817 2847 2839 2842
110 207 239 230 229
111 1090 899 1050 1053
SSD - 100143 4199 5798
to compute SSD, with independence (IND) as a bench mark. The results are reported in
Table B.5.
Table B.5
Model Fitness with Training and Testing Data
Behavior Data IND CIAD CIMD
000 217 176 203 203
001 701 702 704 703
010 58 53 53 53
011 166 212 183 184
100 113 148 122 123
101 585 591 588 586
110 32 45 43 44
111 233 179 209 209
SSD - 8242 1317 1365
Having presented two models of dependence through pathway 1©, attention is now
turned to modeling dependence through pathway 2©.
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Attraction Interactions
In order to work in attraction space, a λ value of 2.95 is used. Attractions ŝEiFjSk can
then be calculated by reversing the logit rule with the attraction ŝE0F0S0 normalized to zero.
Since independence ⇒ pure additive relationship from sEi,sFj ,sSk to sEiFjSk , then relaxing
this assumption by adding coefficients and cross terms to the pure additive form will relax
the assumption of independence. The regression equation
ŝEiFjSk = θE ŝEi +θF ŝFj +θSŝSk +θEF ŝEi ŝFj +θESŝEi ŝSk +θFSŝFj ŝSk +θEFSŝEi ŝFj ŝSk
was used to estimate the parameters θ by minimizing the sum of squared errors εEFS =
ŝEFS− sEFS, while constraining some of the θ’s to zero. There are eight equations of this
form, and since under the logit rule, attractions are non-unique up to a scalar, normalizing
leaves seven equations to estimate θ’s. The results are displayed in Table B.6, where
θ = (θE ,θF ,θS,θEF ,θES,θFS,θEFS)′. In this table and following tables, where relevant,
significance has been denoted by ∗∗∗ for the .01 level, ∗∗ for the .05 level, and ∗ for
the .10 level. From the table it can be seen that the pure additive model, where θ =
(1,1,1,0,0,0,0)′ gives the same results as the independence assumption from Table B.4.
When the model is given full flexibility (seven θ values) the model can perfectly match the
observed attractions, as expected. The final three columns of Table B.6 show three special
cases of the regression: when only coefficients on the linear terms are allowed to be non-
zero, when only the three-way interaction coefficient is restricted to zero, and when both
the three-way interaction and two-way FS coefficients are restricted to zero.
The results show that giving flexibility on the linear terms alone actually decreases the
ability of the model to predict the observed behavior. This result seems counterintuitive
since the regression could have selected θ = (1,1,1,0,0,0,0)′ and done better, however
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Table B.6
Comparing Attraction Regression Models
Behavior Data
θE
θF
θS
θEF
θES
θFS
θEFS
=
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
3.10
1.20
0.87
4.05
−4.62
−.18
3.14
1.73
1.11∗∗∗
0.97∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
3.18∗∗
1.21∗∗
0.86∗∗
4.66∗
−5.14∗
−.25
0
3.38∗∗
1.17∗∗∗
0.89∗∗∗
5.01∗
−5.44∗
0
0
000 1054 888 1054 994 1056 1039
001 3323 3342 3323 3601 3287 3379
010 264 281 264 275 261 268
011 913 1055 913 996 926 873
100 641 757 641 753 634 604
101 2817 2847 2817 2727 2857 2906
110 207 239 207 208 210 214
111 1090 899 1090 754 1078 1027
SSD - 100143 0 221029 3334 18165
the regression seeks to minimize squared errors from the attractions, not the probabili-
ties themselves. Forcing θEFS = 0 does not hurt the model much, increasing the sum of
squared differences by only 3% of the error of the independence model. Forcing additional
coefficients to zero hurts the fit of the behavior prediction considerably. The only reason-
able fit occurs when forcing θEFS and θFS to zero, the final column in Table B.6. While
this finding concurs with the analysis showing that diet and smoking are independent given
exercise, the dependence model does not predict the data as well as either of the previous
models.
This regression approach to predict aggregate attractions given sub-behavior attrac-
tions suffers from several flaws. The first is related to the normalization required by the
logit rule to compute attractions from probabilities. The attractions are currently normal-
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Table B.7
Comparing Attraction Regression Models: Positive Attractions
Behavior Data
θE
θF
θS
θEF
θES
θFS
θEFS
=
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1.52
.98
1.25
4.06
−5.84
−.35
3.14
1.34∗
1.06∗∗∗
1.07∗∗∗
0
0
0
0
1.44∗∗∗
.97∗∗∗
1.24∗∗∗
4.66∗∗
−5.31∗∗∗
−.28∗∗
0
1.66∗∗
.93∗∗∗
1.21∗∗∗
4.28∗
−5.64∗∗
0
0
000 1054 888 1054 861 1068 1019
001 3323 3342 3323 3545 3283 3364
010 264 281 264 254 261 267
011 913 1055 913 1045 925 882
100 641 757 641 695 633 597
101 2817 2847 2817 2861 2854 2960
110 207 239 207 205 207 205
111 1090 899 1090 843 1077 1015
SSD - 100143 0 169677 3562 31757
ized so that attractions to the unhealthy behaviors are 0, and the non-zero attraction to
healthy sub-behaviors is computed from the data. This results in ŝE0 = ŝF0 = ŝS0 , forcing
much of the ‘data’ in the regression equations to zero. This combined with the fact that
the attractions to healthy sub-behaviors can be negative or positive, and are multiplied by
each other, ruins the interpretation of the coefficients, and the generality of the regression
results. This point is to be highlighted further later.
The regressions were repeated using a different normalization scheme. The normal-
ization used was to set attractions to all the less frequently chosen actions to zero. This
normalization has the affect of causing all the attractions to be positive. The same set of
regressions was performed, and found the results were similar and are reported in Table
B.7. Normalizing such that all the attractions are positive seems to improve the signifi-
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cance of the regression output. This evidence suggests that the fit of these models is not
too sensitive to the normalization chosen.
Consistency Coefficients
Building on the previous results, and seeking to improve on the clarity of the results
from the previous regression, regressions were also run of the form
ŝEiFjSk = θE ŝEi +θF ŝFj +θSŝSk +θE=F1i= j +θE 6=F1i 6= j +θE=S1i=k +θE 6=F1i 6= j
to capture the increased likelihood of (un)healthy smoking and diet behaviors when exer-
cise behavior is (un)healthy. The results of this regression are reported in Table B.8, where
now θ = (θE ,θF ,θS,θE=F ,θE 6=F ,θE=S,θE 6=S)′.
Since θE=F ,θE 6=F ,θE=S,θE 6=S are a linearly dependent set, one of the coefficients must
be zero. The coefficients make sense given the observation about how consistent sub-
behaviors are more likely while inconsistent sub-behaviors are less likely. Given that an
individual exercises (i = 1), the combined diet and smoking behaviors receive the follow-
ing attraction changes:
While it may seem strange that all of these changes are negative, since the logit rule
normalizes a monotonic function of attractions to find probabilities, the relative changes
show the impact of exercising on diet and smoking behavior. Again the attractions are
re-normalized to make all attractions positive, and the regression is run again.
Interestingly the predicted observation are exactly the same despite the new normal-
ization, again showing the results have little sensitivity to the normalization chosen. The
signs and size of the coefficients are different, although the total relative effect is very
similar, and the significance of the regression has decreased.
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Table B.8
Regression with Sub-behavior Consistency
Behavior Data
θE
θF
θS
θEF
θES
θFS
θEFS
=
1.13∗
1.03∗∗∗
1.04∗∗∗
−0.07∗
−0.12∗∗
0.06∗
0
000 1054 1020
001 3323 3367
010 264 268
011 913 883
100 641 607
101 2817 2918
110 207 214
111 1090 1032
SSD - 18938
Table B.9
Attraction Changes Given Exercise
FS Behavior ∆s
F1S1 -0.01
F1S0 -0.06
F0S1 -0.07
F0S0 -0.12
Discussion
In deciding whether to model dependence through pathway 1© or 2©, there should
be some consideration of the ‘physical’ process being modeled. That is, consumers are
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Table B.10
Regression with Sub-behavior Consistency: Positive Attractions
Behavior Data
θE
θF
θS
θEF
θES
θFS
θEFS
=
1.14∗
1.03∗∗∗
1.04∗∗∗
0.02
−0.04
0.06∗
0
000 1054 1020
001 3323 3367
010 264 268
011 913 883
100 641 607
101 2817 2918
110 207 214
111 1090 1032
SSD - 18938
attracted to varying degrees to a finite set of sub-behaviors. These behaviors interact in
a dependent fashion. Does it seem more plausible that attractions to joint-behaviors are
adjusted according to the consistency of their composing sub-behaviors, or that consumers
form probabilities of each sub-behavior, and then adjust these probabilities based on the
outcome of a ‘first-move’ sub-behavior. For me, both alternatives are plausible. The first
possibility, 2©, is a sort of premeditated dependence, whereby the consumer thinks ahead
and says “Well, if I exercise, there is no point in smoking.” or “If I’m going to eat right, I
might as well exercise too.” The second type of dependence 1©, is based on the reality that
each sub-behavior is not chosen simultaneously, and that based on the sequential nature
of the decisions, there is some preference for consistency with regards to the healthiness
of behaviors. That is, the consumer thinks “Now that I’ve exercised, I might as well not
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waste my efforts by eating unhealthily”. After considering the plausibility of each model
of dependence, and the ability to characterize the data, pathway 1© and the CIAD model
is implemented.
Estimating Transition Probabilities
The large number of transition probabilities to be estimated requires use of a parametric
model to increase the power of the data. For this purpose, a multinomial logit model
is used to estimate the transition probabilities for consumer health-health-action tuples.
Letting T denote the set of possible transitions, the model calculates the probability of a
given transition j by
p( j|x,a;µ,β) = e
µBPx, j+µHDLx, j +µTCx, j +βEXRj aEXR+βFATj aFAT+βSMKj aSMK
∑i∈T eµ
BP
x,i +µ
HDL
x,i +µ
TC
x,i +βEXRi aEXR+βFATi aFAT+βSMKi aSMK
. (B.5)
To reduce the number of unknown parameters to be estimated, the set of possible health
state transitions modeled is limited to those where no sub-state increases or decreases by
more than one category. The notation {↑,↓,→} is used to designate the increase, decrease,
or constant transition of a health sub-state category. Considering the size of the categories
and the length of one time period, this assumption limiting the observable transitions is
violated in only the most extreme cases. The β parameters capture the influence of the
consumer’s behavior on state transitions including the interaction of sub-state transitions.
The µ parameters capture the trend of each sub-health dimension to transition up (becom-
ing less healthy), down (becoming more healthy), or staying the same, given the level of
the sub-health state. The model is prevented from predicting transitions outside the state
space (e.g. a HDL state decrease from current state HDL-1) by setting the µi0,↓ parame-
ters for i ∈ {BP,HDL,TC} equal to −M, a large negative number. The same is done for
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µTC5,↑ and µ
j
4,↑ for j ∈ {BP,HDL}. This model results in a total of 114 parameters1 to be
estimated. The parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function of the
observed transitions Z.
µˆ, ˆβ = max
µ,β
LL(µ,β),
where LL(µ,β) = log∏z∈Z p(z;µ,β) uses (B.5). In order to optimize in such a large dimen-
sional space, simulated annealing, a heuristic statistical optimization approach is used.
Simulated annealing (see Spall (2003)) searches increasingly narrow neighborhoods of
a current solution, moving to new solutions probabilistically based on the relative fitness
of the new solution. In what follows, let θ = (µ,β). The updating step is performed by the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with updating step ζ ∼U [−l−.4, l−.4], the local candidate
deviation for each dimension of θ during iteration l.
θl+1 =
 θl +ζ with probability ρ = e∆LL/Tl ∧1,θl otherwise, (B.6)
where ∆LL = LL(θl + ζ)−LL(θl). This wide and slowly narrowing local neighborhood
is used to avoid getting stuck in local optima near the starting solution. The schedule
Tl = [log(1+ l)]−1 is used following the recommendation of Robert and Casella (2010).
Ten different starting solutions are used to provide a robustness check for the solution to
the maximum likelihood problem.
In order to obtain each starting solution, 100,000 simple Monte Carlo draws are taken
from the parameter space, and the best of each set becomes a starting solution. Rather than
allow each of the parameters to range across the entire real line, the parametric model and
1The β parameters total #{↑,↓,→}#{BP,HDL,TC} · #{EXR,FAT,SMK} = 33 · 3 = 81, and the µ parameters
total #{↑,↓,→}· [#(BP states)+#(HDL states)+#(TC states)]−fixed µ’s = 3 · (5+4+4)−6 = 33.
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knowledge of the effect of the consumer’s behaviors can provide intuition for coming up
with initial guesses for the parameters.
p(↓↓↓ |aEXR = 1, ·) = p(↓↓↓ |aEXR = 0, ·) · eβEXR↓↓↓ ,
therefore, βEXRj should be positive for healthy transitions that exercising would encourage
and negative for unhealthy transitions. The same logic would hold for smoking and eating
a low fat diet. Further, βEXRj = 2 would mean that ceteris paribus, exercising would create
a 7.4-fold increase in the probability of transition j. The following guesses of β are used
to guide the Monte Carlo draws
˜βEXR = ˜βFAT = ˜βSMK =
→ ↑ ↓
→ ↑ ↓ → ↑ ↓ → ↑ ↓
→ 0 −.33 .33 −.33 −.66 0 .33 0 .66
↑ −.33 −.66 0 −.66 −1 −.33 0 −.33 .33
↓ .33 0 .66 0 −.33 .33 .66 .33 1
,
where the labeling of the dimensions as ∆BP,∆HDL,∆TC is indifferent. Similarly, initial
guesses of µ˜x,→= 0, µ˜x,↑= .1, µ˜x,↓=−.1 for all sub-health states are based on the nature of
health to deteriorate, rather than improve over time. Based on these guesses Monte Carlo
draws for starting solutions to the simulated annealing are taken by sampling uniformly
from the range centered at the guess, and spanning 4 multiples of the guess. For example,
βEXR↓→↓∼U [−.66,1.98]. Concerning parameters for which the guess is zero, draws are taken
from U [−1,1]. Simulated annealing (B.6) was performed for 100,000 replications on each
of the 10 starting solutions to arrive at 10 estimates of the maximum likelihood parameters.
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In order to test how well the ten starting solutions converge to find an global optimum,
correlations as well as average and maximum absolute deviations were computed for each
set of parameters.
Table B.11
Pearson Correlations Between Simulated Annealing Probabilities
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
7 1.00 1.00 1.00
8 1.00 1.00
9 1.00
Table B.12
Maximum Absolute Deviations Between Simulated Annealing Probabilities
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04
2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.03
3 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.06
4 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.06
5 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05
6 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.05
7 0.10 0.10 0.10
8 0.04 0.04
9 0.04
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Table B.13
Average Absolute Deviations Between Simulated Annealing Probabilities
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.01
8 0.00 0.00
9 0.00
The probabilities produced from the simulated annealing solutions appear to agree with
one another to a high degree as evident from the high correlations and low average abso-
lute deviations. Comparing the parameters from the simulated annealing solutions, more
variation between solutions can be found. Part of this variation can be attributed to the fact
that the parameters of the multinomial logit model are non-unique in their prediction of
probabilities. This characteristic means that correlation may be a more meaningful mea-
sure of closeness than absolute deviations. The following tables report the correlations,
and maximum and absolute deviations for the sets of parameters from the multinomial
logit model.
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Table B.14
Pearson Correlations - βEXR Parameters
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.92 0.63 0.16 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.49 0.26 0.62
2 0.60 0.04 0.81 0.75 0.87 0.51 0.12 0.63
3 -0.12 0.31 0.36 0.44 0.33 0.04 0.53
4 0.31 0.17 0.25 -0.01 0.94 0.21
5 0.90 0.75 0.32 0.34 0.34
6 0.67 0.37 0.24 0.27
7 0.29 0.36 0.63
8 -0.02 0.33
9 0.22
Table B.15
Pearson Correlations - βFAT Parameters
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.84 0.68 0.81 0.71 0.20 0.31 0.48 0.04 0.49
2 0.66 0.60 0.69 0.02 0.12 0.20 -0.25 0.51
3 0.78 0.19 -0.16 -0.04 0.41 0.04 0.47
4 0.26 0.07 0.29 0.39 0.25 0.42
5 0.19 0.23 0.17 -0.32 0.29
6 0.40 0.45 0.34 -0.33
7 0.40 0.00 -0.37
8 0.24 -0.06
9 -0.18
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Table B.16
Pearson Correlations - βSMK Parameters
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.91 0.81 0.90 0.68 0.82 0.75 0.84 0.89 0.91
2 0.76 0.92 0.46 0.79 0.85 0.94 0.71 0.74
3 0.72 0.52 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.64 0.55
4 0.39 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.68 0.78
5 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.72 0.72
6 0.72 0.88 0.82 0.72
7 0.83 0.49 0.52
8 0.69 0.67
9 0.93
Table B.17
Pearson Correlations- µBP Parameters
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.87 0.82 1.00 0.93 0.62 0.76 0.98 0.95 0.94
2 0.82 0.86 0.92 0.78 0.35 0.89 0.78 0.70
3 0.82 0.84 0.63 0.46 0.81 0.72 0.85
4 0.92 0.63 0.77 0.99 0.97 0.94
5 0.52 0.50 0.88 0.79 0.84
6 0.30 0.74 0.70 0.46
7 0.74 0.85 0.84
8 0.98 0.90
9 0.90
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Table B.18
Pearson Correlations - µHDL Parameters
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.93 0.80 0.96 0.99 0.85 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.91
2 0.72 0.87 0.97 0.89 0.76 0.87 0.96 0.86
3 0.61 0.74 0.59 0.62 0.67 0.57 0.95
4 0.95 0.77 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.79
5 0.87 0.88 0.93 0.97 0.89
6 0.78 0.94 0.81 0.67
7 0.95 0.80 0.74
8 0.85 0.77
9 0.77
Table B.19
Pearson Correlations - µTC Parameters
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.82 0.81 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.97 0.96 0.88
2 0.37 0.77 0.91 0.81 0.63 0.83 0.73 0.73
3 0.86 0.56 0.72 0.84 0.80 0.85 0.55
4 0.80 0.89 0.88 0.97 0.91 0.65
5 0.91 0.68 0.91 0.87 0.92
6 0.66 0.91 0.95 0.79
7 0.85 0.82 0.65
8 0.92 0.79
9 0.83
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Table B.20
Pearson Correlations - All Parameters
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.80 0.72 0.83 0.79 0.74 0.72 0.76 0.77 0.81
2 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.78 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.67
3 0.52 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.61
4 0.62 0.61 0.67 0.66 0.82 0.63
5 0.59 0.39 0.49 0.61 0.65
6 0.51 0.62 0.63 0.53
7 0.54 0.55 0.53
8 0.64 0.51
9 0.56
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